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BACKGROUND
CONFIDENTIAL
3.
The attached paper, agreed with SEAD, UND, Hong Kong and UKMis
Geneva, sets out factually the situation, predicts how it is
likely
to develop if matters are left as they are, and examines all the
options of which we have been able to think, setting out
advantages and disadvantages.
4. The general prognosis (paras 12-13) is that unless there is
successful action to contain the problem, the situation is likely to
deteriorate. On reasonable assumptions it could deteriorate quite
rapidly between now and 1988. We could eventually face rioting in
the camps: such a situation, besides creating difficult security
problems and much human misery, would certainly result in widespread
criticism or condemnation of HMG. For these reasons a policy of
inaction at this stage
seems neither viable nor sensible.
5. On the other hand there are no easy options, nor can we say
with any certainty that any of the courses of action which have been
identified will be successful in containing the problem. A full
solution to the problem requires success both in increasing the rate
of departures and in decreasing the rate of arrivals. If the latter
cannot be achieved there is some danger that better resettlement
rates will actually stimulate more refugee arrivals.
Increasing resettlement
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1984 83
88?
6.
There is no doubt that the key to any action by HMG to persuade
resettlement countries to increase offtake is action ourselves to
take more refugees from Hong Kong. Without this we are in an
impossible position to persuade other countries to do more.
Although our record since 1975 is not a bad one (we have accepted
19000) in the last 3 years resettlement here has fallen drastically
(we have accepted less than 500 from Hong Kong in that time) and
other resettlement countries are aware of this.
7.
We therefore consider that we should make a major effort to get
a further resettlement programme in this country started. The
CONFIDENTIAL