THIS IS A COPY
CONFIDENTIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CLOSED CENTRE POLICY
1.
Effect on arrivals figures
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN CLOSED UNDER
FOI EXEMPTION NO...27).
The policy has been partially successful in that it appears to have
helped to reduce the number of refugee arrivals: 1983 arrivals were
53% down on 1982, 1984 were 39% down on 1983, (compared with
reductions of 36% in 1983, and 17% in 1984 in the South East Asian
region as a whole). However against this succe 8 S must be offset the
following negative points:
(a)
Social/psychological consequences
1
Average length of stay in the closed centres is now 17 months;
longest stayers have been there 2 years. There is growing concern
that the confinement is making refugees more difficult to settle
elsewhere and prone to violence. There have been sporadic outbreaks
of violence and A 3 day hunger strike. Such manifestations seem
certain to increase and worsen unless prospects for
improve markedly.
(b) Public criticism
·
resettlement
The policy, which is undoubtedly distasteful, has been criticised, though not vehemently, by British MPs and journalists visiting Hong Kong. The British Refugee Council, the main UK body concerned with refugee questions (partly funded by the Home Office and to a much lesser extent by the ODA and FCO) have examined the policy and have made suggestions as to how the centres might be improved. Some of these have been implemented. The BRC, while remaining critical, appear to regard the centres as a necessary evil, and recognise that there is no prospect of the Hong Kong Government abandoning them while boat people continue to arrive. UNHCR, although they help finance the centres, have stated publicly that they consider the detention of refugees "under prison-like conditions for prolonged periods of time, in accordance with a policy of so-called humane deterrence" to be "at variance with the principles of international
protection". (Notes on International Protection, 9 August 1984).
(c)
CONFIDENTIAL