<
and
considerably since the initial influx in 1979, the rate at which refugees from Hong Kong were being accepted for resettlement overseas was falling sharply. Hong Kong was therefore faced with the
propect of the camp population rising again to the levels of 1979/80, without any prospect of a corresponding increase in resettlement. The resultant
situation would rapidly have become unmanageable. Since a refusal to allow refugee boats to enter Hong Kong was
is considered unacceptable for humanitarian reasons, the closed camp policy was the
most humane measure of deterrence that was available
to the Hong Kong Government. There was strong public pressure in Hong Kong
Kong to introduce such a policy for
several reasons: similar policies had already been adopted by other places of asylum in the region (in s ome cases since 1979); Hong Kong already experienced
acute problems as a result of the large influx of immigrants from China
in recent years and the public were alarmed at the prospect of Hong Kong giving the shelter indefinitely to increasing numbers of
and
Vietnamese; they objected to the fact that there was
ん an "open door" policy towards the Vietnamese while.
Chinese illegal immigrants, with whom they had close
cultural, and often
and often family, ties were a 8 a matter o Government policy repatriated to China (whereas since late 1979 ethnic Vietnamese, with no cultural or links with Hong Kong, have comprised 98 percent
arrivals in the territory from Vietnam). They did
see why the Vietnamese should be given
treatment, especially since to an increasing their primary motivation for leaving their coun like that of Chinese immigrants, seemed to be econ rather than political.