considerably since the initial influx in 1979, the
rate at which refugees from Hong Kong were being
accepted for resettlement overseas was falling
sharply. Hong Kong was therefore faced with the
propect of the camp population rising again to the
levels of 1979/80, without any prospect of a
corresponding increase in resettlement. The resultant
situation would rapidly have become unmanageable.
Since a refusal to allow refugee boats to enter Hong
Kong was
is considered unacceptable
humanitarian
and
for
such a policy for
had already been
reasons, the closed camp policy was the
most humane measure of deterrence that was available
to the Hong Kong Government. There was strong public
pressure in Hong Kong to introduce
several reasons: similar policies
adopted by other places of asylum in the region (in
s ome cases since 1979); Hong Kong already experienced
acute problems as a result of the large influx of
immigrants from China in recent years and
the public
and
were alarmed at the prospect of Hong Kong giving the
shelter indefinitely to increasing numbers of
Vietnamese; they objected to the fact that there was
ん an "open door" policy towards the Vietname se while Chinese illegal immigrants, with whom they had close
cultural, and often family, ties were as a matter of Government policy repatriated to China (whereas since
late 1979 ethnic Vietnamese, with no cultural or other
links with Hong Kong, have comprised 98 percent of all arrivals in the territory from Vietnam). They did not
why the Vietnamese should be given special
treatment, especially since to an increasing extent their primary motivation for leaving their country, like that of Chinese immigrants, seemed to be economic
rather than political.
see