ра
Mis Whather Hikiy
SCORRI
PROOF:
IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL PUBLISHED
Ev. 5
HOUSE OF COMMONS
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN BEFORE THE
HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
RACE RELATIONS & IMMIGRATION
SUB-COMMITTEE
ник 24312
MONDAY 4 FEBRUARY 1985
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
DESK OFF!GEN INDEX
20 FEB 1965
REGISTRY {
PA
Acti
Taban
он
MR R LUCE, MP, MR A C GALSWORTHY,
DR D C WILSON and MR D CARTER
Evidence heard in Public
Questions 212-247
MEMBERS' CORRECTIONS
Any Member of the Committee who wishes to correct the Questions addressed by him to a Witness is asked to send the correction to the Committee Clerk as soon as possible.
Members receiving these Minutes of Evidence are asked to ensure that the Minutes are confined to the object for which they are printed the special use of the Members of the Committee—and are not given wider circulation.
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE
THE HOME AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE ON RACE RELATIONS AND IMMIGRATION
119
Mr Jeremy Hanley
MONDAY 4 FEBRUARY 1985
Members present:
Mr John Wheeler in the Chair
Mr John Hunt
Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
I ADMISSION of Further Vietnamese Refugees to BRITAIN
A. GENERAL
Summary
1. UK policy on Vietnamese refugees is influenced by both domestic and foreign policy considerations. There is continuing evidence that the Vietnamese refugee community in the UK, who number over 18,500, have found it difficult to assimilate notwithstanding our efforts to assist. Over 80 per cent of Vietnamese adults here are unemployed. This fact suggests that resettlement in this country is not the ideal solution for the Vietnamese themselves though the Government will continue to do their best for those here. However we have a continuing international commitment to resettle family reunion and ship rescue cases (see paras 7-10 below). We agree with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that resettlement in countries like the UK is the least acceptable long-term solution, and we are working with UNHCR and other resettlement countries to find other durable solutions, eg voluntary repatriation and/or local integration. But such solutions are likely to prove hard to achieve and will take time.
2. We have the serious problem of unsettled refugees (some 12,800) in Hong Kong (see parts IB and II below). The difficulties this gives rise to in Hong Kong provide a strong incentive for us to find ways of resettling them outside the colony. But the major resettlement countries (United States, France, Canada and Australia) have increasingly taken the line that they cannot be expected to take more from Hong Kong if we are not prepared to do so too. There is no guarantee of course that they would in fact follow our lead. But some gesture from the United Kingdom would almost certainly improve Hong Kong's position. The Hong Kong Authorities continue to press us in this regard (see part II).
Background
3. The most serious exodus of refugees from Vietnam began in 1978, three years after the communist victory in the south. That year, some 150,000 refugees left Indo-China for temporary asylum elsewhere. Over 85,000 of them fled by boat from Vietnam. Of these over 6,000 arrived in Hong Kong. In addition, 260,000 Vietnamese of Chinese origin were forced out of Vietnam into China during the same year. These movements reflected first intensified pressure by the Vietnamese Government on the private sector of the economy, particularly in southern Vietnam, and second a sudden deterioration in Vietnam's relations with China. (At Annex A are tables and charts of refugee movements prepared by UNHCR on information available to them. The UNHCR figures for the UK do not necessarily accord exactly with the Government's own figures quoted in the memoran- dum).
The cost of printing and publishing these Minutes of Evidence is estimated by Her Majesty's Stationery Office at £000.
(
120
4 February 1985]
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE
[Continued
4. In the view of HMG, the root cause of the exodus of refugees from Vietnam is political and economic repression. We have therefore exerted pressure on the Vietnamese government to face up to the responsibility incurred by them in creating the refugee problem. The institution by the Vietnamese of an Orderly Departure Programme (see para 10 below) represents a certain recognition by the Vietnamese of this principle. Seeking other ways to bring home the message, the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons on 3 July 1979: "There will be no more aid to Vietnam so long as the present circumstances continue". HMG have also spoken out about human rights abuses in Vietnam eg in this year's Human Rights Commission and have encouraged other UN member states to put political and economic pressure on Vietnam designed to bring about improvements.
Resettlement
5. In January 1979, in response to growing international concern at the plight of Indo- China's refugees, HMG agreed to admit a further 1,500 refugees from Indo-China, in addition to the 300 or so already here. It was decided that, because of our responsibilities for the territory, 1,000 of these should come from Hong Kong. Of the remaining 500, the majority came from camps in Thailand and Malaysia. In the course of 1979 the refugee problem worsened. Nearly 400,000 refugees left Indo-China that year. Over 68,000 of them arrived in Hong Kong by boat. In response to the crisis a special UN Conference was held in Geneva in July 1979. As a result, the UK accepted a further quota of 10,000 refugees; these were exclusively Vietnamese who had found temporary refuge in Hong Kong.
6. But the humanitarian crisis continues. To date Britain has in response taken in over 18,500 Indo-Chinese refugees, making us the sixth largest recipient after the United States, Australia, Canada, France and the FRG. Our contribution to resettlement has nonetheless been regarded as relatively small, measured against the performance of the three major resettlement countries for Vietnamese boat refugees: the United States (which has taken over 358,000 since the initial exodus in early 1975), Australia (over 68,000) and Canada (over 60,000). France and the FRG have taken in over 96,000 and over 22,000 Indo- Chinese respectively.
Ship Rescue
7. 1978 saw mounting international concern about the plight of Vietnamese refugees seeking to leave Vietnam by boat. These refugees often fled in small, unseaworthy craft, and were easy prey for pirates. Many boat people in distress were being rescued by merchant ships including British ships but a means had to be found to facilitate their disembarkation in ports where they would otherwise not be allowed to land. HMG therefore decided in 1978 that boat refugees rescued by ships registered in the UK would normally be accepted for resettlement here if no other country had agreed to take them within 90 days of the rescue. Over 3,000 Vietnamese have been admitted to the UK on this basis.
8. In July this year, the UK agreed to join for a trial period the Rescue At Sea Resettlement Offers (RASRO) scheme designed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to encourage ship rescues of boat people and to spread the flow of refugees evenly between the most suitable resettlement countries. Under the system described in para 7 above, those resettled in the UK often had no family links here. We have accepted a quota of 150 individuals for resettlement in the first year of the new scheme. This will be put into effect when pledges for the planned 4,000 resettlement places have been received. (So far 11 western countries have pledged 2,300 places). We have indicated to UNHCR that our contribution to RASRO relates uniquely to rescues by UK registered vessels and does not include Hong Kong registered British ships.
Family Reunion
9. In addition to the measures described, HMG have also sought to observe the principles of family unity. At first broad criteria were adopted for the admission of relatives from Vietnam but, as the numbers rose, we felt it necessary to apply the same criteria to