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the morale of the Civil Service and of the Police will be vital. Their steadiness and loyalty have brought Hong Kong through two difficult and unsettling years. They will need to be convinced that their role and performance will be as valued after 1997 as it has been before.
34. The third essential task will be to establish a more visibly representative form of government in which, to quote the words of the Hong Kong Government White Paper, "the system of government is firmly rooted in the community”. This process will inevitably be accompanied by a more highly charged political atmosphere in Hong Kong. Any new government structure which emerges is very unlikely to be on the Westminster model. It is not to be expected that the Chinese will tolerate after 1997 confrontational politics in Hong Kong: and in any case the people of Hong Kong do not want them. In the review promised for 1987 we shall need to address difficult and controversial issues, such as the relationship of the future Chief Executive and his Executive Council: the relationship between that Council and the legislature, and whether we should move to direct elections. The attitudes of the Chinese, who are highly suspicious already of our moves towards representative government will be crucial. Things are already moving fast on their side too. They have established a Committee to draft the Basic Law (in effect the mini-constitution) for the Special Administrative Region, and promised that it will be completed by 1990. It will start its consultations this Autumn. The extent to which they incorporate in it a structure of government which gives promise of true autonomy for Hong Kong will determine how far they will be able to maintain the confidence of the community in the agreement. If we on our side can, over the next few years, demonstrate that the kind of system we have in mind will not affront Chinese interests or threaten Hong Kong's stability, then there is at least a chance that the Chinese will incorporate something like it in the Basic Law. The problem is that they do not recognise any role for the UK in drafting that law. Keeping the political development processes in line on their side and ours will not be an easy task.
35.
The fourth essential need will be to achieve international acceptance of the practical arrangements which will be required to sustain Hong Kong's autonomous status. There are over 500 treaties and other international arrangements applying to Hong Kong as a British Territory. Means will have to be found to maintain the applicability of those arrangements, particularly the GATT, to this territory as a Special Administrative Region of China and perpetuate Hong Kong's membership, full or associate, of a large number of international organisations. In this task, British Diplomatic Missions both to those organisations and to the more important member countries will have an important role to play.
36.
Finally, the role of the British Government will be a delicate and demanding one. There will be a constant need to think ahead to the transition which is now only 12 years away. Hong Kong will change, particularly in its relationship with China, as that transition becomes closer. In the early 1990's there will almost certainly be a new period of doubt and anxiety. We shall by then need a firm plan for the withdrawal of the British garrison. If at that time China is still pursuing open-door policies to the outside world and continuing its economic development, that will reassure. If it is not, the transition will be the more difficult. Either way, the smooth removal of the British link will not be easy. The transitional arrangements will need to be complete well before 1997 in order to reduce the impact of that date. In the meantime, while showing no diminution of interest in or concern for the interests of the people of Hong Kong, HMG will have to trust Hong Kong with an increasing degree of autonomy because if the UK does not show faith in Hong Kong's ability to exercise that autonomy responsibly before 1997, the Chinese will have no incentive to do so afterwards. We shall have to do all we can to preserve, not only the stability, but the economic success of Hong Kong if only because that is the prime factor in securing Chinese tolerance of its special status.
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