ONEL AVISAN
DSR 11C
by
to an extent by the availability of funds and the
nature of a command economy. Of course Chinese economic
plans tend to be gnomic, and it is hard to be
authoritative about the future pattern of Chinese trade.
But it is worth remembering that Chinese accession would
bring opportunities as well as risks.
3. Your paper rightly addresses the ways in which other
night
Contracting Parties to the GATT may be able to safeguard
themselves against the strains that the
inclusion of a
would be able t
state-trading economy of China's size and potential might
impose on the open trading system. I am indeed persuaded
by your argument that there would be a sound legal case
for refusing to tolerate Chinese entry by simply taking
up the Chinese seat left vacant in 1950. I further agree
with your thesis that we should be thinking in terms of a
special and selective safeguard clause, perhaps qualified
by a specific Chinese commitment to increase
progressively the level of imports. In this way, we may
turn the fact that the Chinese government at present
imports nothing that it has not specifically decided to
purchase from abroad, to our advantage, as well as by
building into the system progressive increases in import
levels, exploit the inevitable growth of consumer choice
and market orientation that must accompany the
development of an economy attuned more to incentive than
direction.
4. Of course there will be no guarantee that the trading
relationship will flourish satisfactorily. But there is
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