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(a)
(3)
(c)
China's method of joining is likely to be important. As Alan Montgomery has pointed out, we can expect the Chinese to fight hard to resume their old seat; and this would limit our scope (at least so far as the legal basis is concerned) for seeking special conditions for their membership. Could we consider making some gesture to China on the principle (which might cost us little) but only on the understanding that they show flexibility on the practical consequences, as implied in para 17 of the paper.
We also need to be clear whether China should be treated as a state trader or as a developing country (soon to become the newest and biggest NIC) or both. If the first (ie as a state trader), it should be easier to insist on prior conditions on the precedent of the other state traders' protocols of accession, adapted in the light of our experience of their operation, and of China's special characteristics. If the second (as a developing country), it will be more difficult - if not impossible - to apply restrictive measures - eg a specific selective safeguard mechanism. Instead we should need to consider whether China's candidature should not be examined in the context of the role of the developing countries in the GATT within the framework of the new Round. In this connection, it would be worth elaborating on the hint in paragraph 22 of the paper that many developing countries may take a hard- headed view of China's application.
Before reaching any conclusions on the specific options in paragraph 19 of the DEI paper, it would be useful to carry out further work on the precise nature of the problems which we have to tackle. Thus:
(i)
it may be true (paragraph 4 of the DTI paper) that Chinese imports will be decided by the Chinese Government (although this is in part questioned in paragraph 19(c)), but we ought to have an assessment of how likely this is to remain the case in the medium term, given the continuation of current Chinese economic policies. To the extent that it does,
the import commitment option is worth considering; but we need to be as clear as we can on what China's imports are likely to be in the foreseeable future and who is likely to supply them. We might, for example, think twice before investing too much EC negotiating capital in seeking an import target which proved to be of more direct benefit to others (eg Japan);
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(ii) A parallel
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