XXXIII, and
the necessary
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two-thirds majority was not
forthcoming,
it might be
difficult to revert to the Article XXVI 5(c) route.
This is because Hong Kong would be seen to be trying to gain entry to GATT through the back door having failed to get in through the
Even if a belated Article XXVI 5(c) Declaration in Hong Kong's favour could not be stopped, its eventual standing in GATT
would have been seriously undermined.
front.
10. For all these reasons, Option 2 would appear to make Hong Kong
hostage to those who might seek advantage at our expense. It should
not, therefore, be pursued.
11.
Option 3 is less problematic and by far the most desirable and
practical. It would:
(a)
(b)
parry the question of China's membership in the GATT;
avoid having to involve Hong Kong in negotiating entry terms with the Contracting Parties;
(c) enable Hong Kong to acquire separate GATT status at any ti me mutually acceptable to China, the UK and Hong Kong through a Declaration by the United Kingdom.
A further important point in favour of this course is that:
(d)
12.
once Hong Kong became a separate Contracting Party under the
GATT Article XXVI 5(c) procedure, the me re change of
sovereignty in 1997 would not in itself have any effect upon Hong Kong's GATT rights or upon its status in the GATT.
to
The observations in paragraphs 8 and 12(d) above are based on
informal soundings which the United Kingdom Mission in Geneva, and the the Counsellor (Hong Kong) have taken of the legal section
of the GATT Secretariat. Their view is that if Hong Kong were
become a Contracting Party under the Article XXVI 5(c)
5(c) procedure,
there would be no question of Contracting Party status ceasing
solely by virtue of the change of sovereignty in 1997. Only if Hong Kong's autonomy in the conduct of
conduct of its external commercial relations
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