(
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b) Putting the problem in perspective.
Note the
general and practical limitations on the scope and
effectiveness of the "axis", eg
areas where it does not reach (eg most larger
international bodies, most third-world
political and defence issues);
even in its main areas of application, there
are limits on true convergence between French
and German interests and/or methods of
operation: hence patchy performance on such
vital issues as SDI and EUREKA; failure to
follow through schemes and commitments
proclaimed at top political level;
obvious limits on ability of France and
Germany, even jointly and in full agreement,
to impose their will on all issues in all
circumstances.
c)
Preliminary look at the third limb of the
triangle. How does our own relationship with
France and Germany, structural and substantial,
compare with their relationship with each other?
Distinguish carefully between areas: NB in
particular the relative strengths of Britain's
position on defence ("improved" Franco-German
cooperation conspicuously lacking in practical
effect, except on one or two equipment projects).
[To be illustrated with tables at Annex B, drawing
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on the MISC 76 exercise inter alia and taking full
account of recent deliberate efforts to strengthen
and get more credit for bilateral contacts.
points only to be reflected in main paper.]
Broad
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II.
The Case for Action:
A.
General Reasoning.
Important to define the "challenge"
accurately, and not mistake its nature. At
political/Governmental level, Franco-German
"unity" often artificial and/or largely
atmospheric - "condemned to succeed". Must thus
distinguish between uncomfortable feeling of being
"left out", and actual practical consequences.
But the latter do exist. Atmosphere too is a
political fact. Bilaterally, it leads France and
Germany to give each other's views privileged
attention; it can lead one (usually Germany) to
give the other objectively unjustified
preferences or concesions; it creates pressure to
offset each perceived failure of the "axis" by
new, if necessary forced and artificial successes.
Multilaterally, it creates both pressure and
preconditions for Franco-German joint positions
which in turn can all too easily be presented as
"the European line". Unless, therefore, we can
establish ourselves as partners with comparable
(not identical) assets and rights in a three-way
relationship, we face damage to
- our bilateral interests in relation to each
country;
our standing in and capacity to influence a
European Community to which we are now
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