CONFIDENTIAL
4
Subsection
1(2) provides for this clause of the Bill to come into
force on the exchange of instruments of ratification, which
paragraph 8 of
Joint Declaration states must take place before
30 June 1985. The exact date on which instruments of ratification
will be exchanged is not yet known, and will depend both on the date
on which this Bill receives Royal Assent, and on the date when the
Chinese are ready to ratify. The date of the exchange of
instruments of ratification will
ratification will be notified in the London Gazette
of State being presented with
in order to avoid the Secretary
repeated requests to certify that date, eg for the purposes of
litigation in the UK courts
We
Some members of the Executive Council of Hong Kong remain convinced that we should deal with the termination of sovereignty by a clause enabling an Order in Council
to be made at a later stage, perhaps much nearer to 1997. This was an option that we considered earlier
in discussion with EXCO. We
were well aware of the presentational advantages in Hong Kong of withholding the Order until after the
publication by the Chinese Government of the Basic Law for Hong
Kong, which mus t enshrine the provisions of the agreement.
accordingly considered a scheme whereby ratification preceded an Order in Council divesting the UK of sovereignty. The Attorney
General however advised that such a scheme was acceptable if (but
only if) the Order was not in any way subject to Parliamentary
approval. The parliamentary managers agree that Parliament could
indeed seek to retain control by making the Order subject to
affirmative or negative procedures. Ministers therefore decided to deal with the termination of sovereignty by a clause in the Bill
itself.
Presentation apart, there is no practical difference
between the two possible courses.
If the Chinese
including its
s ome fundamental breach of the agreement Parliament
to repeal the Hong Kong Act, termination of sovereignty. This would have the
declining to approve an Order in Council.
however very unlikely to arise.
Given the
we re to commit
could be asked
provisions for
s ame effect as
Such а situation is
inevitability of the
reversion to China of the New Territories in 1997, it is also hard
to
see what our action would achieve.
CONFIDENTIAL