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realism at Westminster as to the extent to which HMG can impose constitutional prescriptions upon Hong Kong without regard to
Chinese sensitivities and concerns. Calls for direct elections
HMG
i s deferring to Chinese
" come what may" were very few. There is however a risk that
perceptions will change if
if the impression gains grounds that
wi shes on the internal
administration of Hong Kong before 1997: We may
then be more
broadly criticised for not providing an adequate representative
basis for Hong Kong's autonomy post-1997.
14.
Even if there is a broadly realistic view there will
continue to be reflections of the more radical viewpoints from Hong Kong. As examples of the differing poles of opinion I
attach recent cuttings from the Economist and Observer on the
one hand, and from the Daily Telegraph on the other.
general moderation of the Westminster view is well demonstrated
by the quotes from parliamentary spokesmen in the Ob server
article.
The
Tentative conclusions
15.
shall need to guide
in Hong Kong with
We have major problems ahead. We
the development of Representative Government
a very careful hand over the next few years. The Governor will
be visiting the UK in the first two months of the New Year:
this opportunity should be used for a thorough discussion with
him.
The 1987 Review represents only the first major landmark
on the path towards 1997. To reach this landmark safely we
shall need to:
(a)
Handle our evolving dialogue with the Chinese with great
care, seeking every opportunity to draw them out,
whether in Hong Kong or in Peking. A flexible mandate
will be needed from EXCO.
(b)
Do all we can to keep down the level
of Chinese concerns
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