GRS 400
OONIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PEKING
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1863
OF 190923Z DECEMBER 85
INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG (FOR GOVERNOR)
HRR OIL/1
DE
INDEX
ZED IN
23 DEC 1985
AB23
FOR WILSON, AUSS
+2.5
YOUR TEL NO 1988 TO HONG KONG, MY TEL NO 1849 AND HONG KONG TELS
NO 2842 AND 2352
(+13
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG
1. IF OUR OBJECTIVE IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE CHINESE IS TO BE SOMETHING LIKE THE ONE SUGGESTED IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF MY TUR, I DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD A PRIORI FORM HARD AND FAST VIEWS ABOUT WHO SHOULD SPEAK TO WHOM ABOUT WHAT AND WHEN. IT IS OF COURSE THE CASE THAT THE DAY-TO-DAY CONSIDERATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS TAKES PLACE IN HONG KONG AND NOT IN PEKING. IT IS ALSO THE CASE THAT XU JIATUN IS AN IMPORTANT ACTOR ON THE CHINESE SIDE AND THAT ZHOU NAN, MY **NATURAL' INTERLOCUTOR HERE, IS IN MANY WAYS AN UNSATISFACTORY PERSON TO TALK TO. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE IMPORTANT DECISIONS ARE TAKEN IN PEKING AND PEKING IS THE PLACE WHERE THE CHINESE WANT TO TALK. BESIDES, I DOUBT WHETHER XU JIATUN IS ALWAYS A RELIABLE COMMUNICATOR OF POINTS MADE TO HIM BY PEOPLE IN HONGK KONG AND STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT HE IS IN BAD ODOUR HERE AT THE MOMENT. 1 FAVOUR BURDEN-SHARING, AGREED AT EACH STAGE AS WE GO ALONG.
2 IN RELATION TO OUR OWN OBJECTIVES, I WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE TO CANVASS WITH THE CHINESE ANY OF THE OPTIONS WHICH THE GOVERNOR MAY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING BEFORE WE HAVE BEGUN TO DRAW THEM OUT ON THEIR OWN IDEAS FOR THE BASIC LAW, HOWEVER SKETCHY THESE MAY BE AT THE MOMENT. TO DO THIS WOULD, IN MY VIEW, BE TO RUN THE RISK OF ENCOURAGING THE CHINESE EXPLICITLY TO ASK US NOT (NOT) TO DO SOMETHING, OR SEVERAL THINGS, IN PARTICULAR.
CONFIDENTAL
13.
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