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DIFFICULT TO INTRODUCE A POWER OF DISSOLUTION AT A LATER STAGE IF WE HAD NOT DONE SO FROM THE BEGINNING, BECAUSE
THIS REALLY COULD BE REPRESENTED AS A REINING BACK. ΤΟ
INTRODUCE THE POWER OF DISSOLUTION NOW THEREFORE ENABLES
US TO KEEP THE OPTIONS OPEN.
II) WE BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE PRUDENT TO RETAIN THE
FLEXIBILITY OVER TIMING OF ELECTIONS WHICH THE POWER OF
DISSOLUTION WILL PROVIDE, EVEN THOUGH FOR THE MOMENT WE
DO NOT ENVISAGE IT BEING USED. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE, AS YOU SUGGEST, TO VARY THE TIMING OF ELECTIONS
BY A SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE PROVISION AT ANY TIME, WE THINK
THAT THIS COULD BE A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR THE SAR,
SINCE A SIMILAR MECHANISM COULD EQUALLY BE USED TO
LENGTHEN THE LIFE OF A LEGISLATURE IN ORDER TO AVOID
ELECTIONS.
III) LOOKING TO THE PERIOD AFTER 1997.
WE ARE INCLINED TO THINK AT THIS STAGE THAT IT WOULD BE
BETTER FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN THE SAR TO HAVE THE
POWER OF DISSOLUTION THAN NOT. WE DO NOT REALLY THINK
THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE POWER WILL PROVIDE A GREATER
INCENTIVE TO COMPROMISE IN A DEADLOCK.
AN INCENTIVE TO COMPROMISE IN
ORDER TO AVOID A CRISIS AND NEW ELECTIONS WILL ALWAYS
EXIST ANYWAY. UNLESS THE LEGISLATURE IS ACTING IN AN
UNPOPULAR WAY, A CHIEF EXECUTIVE WHO DISSOLVES IT WILL
ALWAYS RISK A STRONGER AND FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW MORE
DIFFICULT LEGISLATURE BEING ELECTED. THE SITUATION OF
DEADLOCK WE HAVE IN MIND IS ONE WHERE COMPROMISE HAS
ALREADY FAILED. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF THERE IS NO
POWER TO DISSOLVE THE LEGISLATURE AND CALL FRESH
ELECTIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TEMPTATION WILL BE FOR THE
CHIEF EXECUTIVE TO LOOK TO PEKING TO BACK HIM UP AGAINST
THE LEGISLATURE.
IV) WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD REALLY BE OPEN TO AN
UNSCRUPULOUS CHIEF EXECUTIVE TO USE REPEATED DISSOLUTIONS
TO FRUSTRATE THE CONSTITUTION. SO LONG AS HE WAS
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CONFIDENTIAL