CONFIDENTIAL
Rouge is an embarrassment to us and others who otherwise support the coalition. Earlier this year the Chinese indicated that he and others in the Khmer Rouge leadership might be "retired", but more recently they have shown reluctance to make any changes which might make the resistance less effective.
10. This year the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Co Thach, has put forward various proposals giving the impression that Hanoi's position. on Cambodia was softening. These gave no indication that Vietnam intended to withdraw its troops and we see them as designed to distract attention from Vietnam's continuing occupation of Cambodia. China probably shares this view. But the Vietnamese no doubt realise that in the long run they will have to come to terms with China and that any Cambodia settlement would need tacit Chinese support. Hanoi will be aware too that an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations could mean a lessening in Soviet support for Hanoi's policies in
Cambodia and Laos.
c)
11.
Afghanistan
UNGA debated Afghanistan for the 6th time 13-15 November. The resolution, sponsored by Pakistan and 45 other states, was approved by a record 99 majority (119-20-14).
UN Initiative
12.
The August round of UN "indirect talks" in Geneva made no real progress beyond agreeing to reconvene in February. Pakistan's forthcoming attitude contrasted with the Afghan non-committal reaction on timetable for withdrawal of Soviet troops. There was no evidence of Soviet flexibility. Soviet diplomatic and military pressure on Pakistan, including cross-border attacks, is intended to influence the Pakistani negotiating position and hamper resistance supply lines.
Situation in Afghanistan
13. Inside Afghanistan, the resistance remain resilient despite
CONFIDENTIAL
/Soviet