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we are aiming to leave a "pro-British"
leave a "pro-British" administration in
They probably want to see how they
place in 1997.
develop in Hong Kong before making any decisions of their
own on government structure after 1997.
12. There are a
a number of points either outstanding from the
agreement or which have emerged since. For the reasons given above we do not think the Prime Minister should raise these at
these at the leveal
of Deng or Zhao. We hope that it may be possible for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to raise them informally in a very
restricted session with Wu Xueqian.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Changes in our Nationality law, and title of the new
nationality status. This is a delicate subject. We need
to have Chinese acquiescence in the title which is
proposed for the new nationality status for ex BDTCs (British National: Hong Kong) This will not be easy.
•
Defence. The stationing of PLA troops in Hong Kong is a
sensitive subject, particularly for Deng, and we should
avoid further pronouncements from him. It would
nevertheless be useful if we could get over informally
the idea that the Chinese might make some helpful
statement on this and more particularly on the question
of conscription of Hong Kong people after 1997.
Registration of the agreement at the United Nations. We
need to approach the Chinese to propose joint
registration of the agreement at the United Nations.
This is not normally their practice and there could be
difficulties.
(d)
Participation of Hong Kong officials in the Joint Liaison
Group: There were indications during the talks that the
Chinese might oppose the participation of officials from
the Hong Kong Government in the Joint Liaison Group. We
are publicly committed to appointing such officials to the Group. We need to try to preempt possible Chinese objections. We shall be able to make use in
in this
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