CONFIDENTIAL
negative Parliamentary procedure.
should
My initial feeling, on
indeal
which I strall value your view, is that there could easily
be pressure from Parliament to make it so subject,
particularly as members might take the view that
farliament should see the Basic Law before taking a final
decision. Although there are precedents (particularly in
the case of Rhodesia) for subordinate legislation on a
transfer of sovereignty not to be subject to further
parliamentary consideration, these might not be
sufficient to persuade Parliament to allow the same power
in this case. But if Parliament insisted that the Order
should be subject to Parliamentary procedures, this would
prevent us from ratifying the agreement A final point
is that the Chinese might look askance at our insisting
on leaving legislation until a later date.
The only serious drawback of option (it), on the other
hand, is that the Government might be criticised for
legislating definitively so far in advance. Against this
the Government could argue plausibly that since the date
is now clearly defined, there is no reason not to legislate.() is therefore
our favoured option.
}
until after
the Order had been made,
and this would seriquaty
ssibility
¿call cate question
the
ratifyin
before 30 June 1985, as
we have whether
in the agement.
On (b) (amendment of the BNA) my officials have held
further discussions with Home Office officials. It is
not necessary to include (b) in the legislation as a
arguments for and against doing so. preliminary to ratification, However to deal with this
aspect in this Act would avoid the need for a future
and there
are
independent act to amend the BNA. I understand that the
not favour
Home Secretary would be opposed to such separate
siin the fist disumin йодск), ком
Eu
dirt couchmang thail we
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Lor
and
مرايا
this points
thinking has
developed.
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