SECRET
(d)
The joint group (if agreed) could be used
could be used to demonstrate HMG's
continuing involvement and to provide a channel for
Sino-British communication on the ground in the event of
unrest. It might thus be able to help defuse any movement
towards disorder.
Disadvantages
(i) The Chinese could aim to exploit the more prominant role of
the Joint Group in order to interfere in Hong Kong before.
1997.
(ii)
(iii)
Our explicit retention of reserve powers might be held to
encourage the Central People's Government to as sume the same
powers after 1997 but already these would either be explicit
in the agreement (defence and foreign affairs) or implicit in
the provision that the Chief Executive of Hong Kong would be
appointed by the President of the PRC.
If this use of the Joint Group was not enough to discourage disorder there would be obvious difficulties in exercising
our reserve powers at long range.
ARGUMENT
11.
of
of
or
There are obvious problems in going for either of the extremes
an appointed British Governor on the present basis (Option A) an elected local Governor to take over from him (Option B).
Neither of these seems adequately to satisfy all the considerations
outlined in paragraphs 2-4 above. The incentive for us to set up a
system with some kind of elected office at the top, with Chinese
acquiesence, is very great. In many ways, the compromise of a British Governor and an elected Chief Minister (Option C) is an
attractive solution. We should stand a good chance of getting the
Chinese to agree to it and it would be at least a half-way house
towards a Chief Executive of the SAR. Against this is the strong
temptation for the Chinese to reproduce the same pattern after 1997.
Moreover as we shall probably be involved in a joint group in any case, there are strong arguments for making use of it and of driving
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