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interest and we had some influence, but we had to recognise that Central America was their backyard rather than ours.
32.
Mr Derek Thomas confirmed that there were widely differing American views: Mr Shultz favoured a policy of carrot and stick, but some in the Administration favoured a tougher course if it would succeed in clearing out an unacceptable regime. In talking to the Russians or East Europeans, it could be useful to relate American conduct in Central America to the Russian behaviour in Afghanistan. For example, in Bulgaria, where he had just been, they accepted that the Americans had both interests and responsibilities in an area adjacent to the United States. The Bulgarians had taken the point that the Americans had tried to bring pressure to bear on Nicaragua but had not marched in and devastated the country with 150,000 troops. He added that there were worries about the American attitude to a Contadora settlement. They appeared to argue that foreign military exercises could be held while foreign military advisers would not be permitted. It was not clear that this was a feasible element for inclusion in a Contadora Act.
33. Mr Clark asked whether the Mexicans were holding out for the second Contadora document. Mr Marchand confirmed that this was so. They wanted to stick to the September draft; they dismissed the Tegucigalpa version although they were willing to consider some of the amendments put forward in the Tegucigalpa draft. The Canadian Government had said that they would provide a detailed critique of the Contadora draft but would not produce an entirely new paper of their own. He asked for the British view as to the extent that the Americans were committed to the Contadora process and as to what was the American "bottom line" in regard to Nicaragua. The Canadians themselves thought that if we succeeded in blocking the export to neighbouring countries of the Sandinista ideological system, the Americans would come to live with it.
34.
The Secretary of State said that in assessing the American attitude we had to bear in mind the example of Grenada. Our instincts at the time had been that it was not right for them to effect a transformation of the political regime by force. now acknowledged that this had been for the better, although there had been a political cost to the US.
We
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