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3. The following problems can be foreseen:
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b.
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e.
JAPAN
how to ensure a visible Hong Kong participation in the Joint Liaison Group and, indirectly, in drafting the Basic Law, without antagonising the Peking regime, who will continue to hold the whip hand;
how to construct a liberal and responsive home-grown democracy which will survive the traumas of 1997, without the upheaval which would attend the introduction of full-blooded party politics;
how to allay the fears of BDTCs that they will be left with a hollow and untransmittable nationality status;
how to defend Hong Kong against creeping foreign protectionism, which could stifle the export trade which provides her life blood;
how to guarantee Hong Kong's independent participation in GATT:
4. Like all visitors, I was struck by the enormous size of Tokyo, its vast urban sprawl and the stasis of its traffic. High living standards, accompanying a high cost of living and a notably regimented life-style, were also apparent. I believe that the strain on commuters is becoming so intense that some of them are beginning to rebel. Nevertheless, middle-class ethics are all- pervasive, which is hardly surprising, since the public opinion polls show that 90 per cent of the Japanese consider themselves as belonging to that class. The brand new Fujitsu factory, which turns out advanced automation equipment, which I visited with Sir S Giffard, outside Tokyo, was highly impressive in layout, equipment and in the application to their tasks of the sparse work force. There was no visible union activity. I asked the amiable Executive Director who hosted a spartan lunch in the canteen why Fujitsu valued their cooperative link with ICL. He. replied without hesitation that it was because of his countrymen's high regard for the inventive genius of the British people, proven over many centuries. (What we have to fear here is that the Japanese will turn this sort of cooperation against us by snatching those overseas markets which we have so far been able to preserve.)
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5.
In official talks at the Foreign Ministry and elsewhere, I had a clear impression of a keen desire to multiply contacts with Britain and exchange views with us on all manner of questions. I sensed that many Japanese have a particular regard for Britain, which is rooted in a respect for our historical traditions as well as for our role in their defeat. The link between the two Royal families is also regarded as most important and valuable. was especially struck by the candour of many of my Japanese interlocutors, which I had also noticed at the tripartite planning talks on the Indian Ocean in which the Japanese participated at Wilton Park just before I left.
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KOREA
6.
The South Koreans' attitude to Japan, their closest neighbour, is markedly ambivalent. Despite many ethnic and cultural similarities, the Koreans still feel a lingering bitterness towards the Japanese, who occupied and oppressed their country, at times with great cruelty, between 1910 and 1945. Koreans are justly proud of their own, far more ancient, cultural history (stretching back some 2,500 years), much of it derived from China. They seem more cheerful and less inhibited than the Japanese and wear their increasing prosperity lightly. They also appear to have a strong liking for the British, partly, but not entirely, derived from our firm support of the ROK for over 30 years.
7. Even in the centre of Seoul, with its 9 million population and heavy granite buildings, one is conscious of the proximity of the demilitarised zone, barely as far as is Heathrow Airport from Westminster. I received a hair-raising briefing about the North Korean threat 'at the Joint Forces Command before paying a short visit to Panmunjom itself. Hostility hangs heavily in the air there; and an uncomfortable awareness of the violent unpredict- ability of the North Korean regime was heightened by a description on the ground of the latest incident (on 23 November). The vulnerability of South Korea to a wild onslaught which the ageing Kim Il Sung, or his equally unpredictable son, Kim Jong Il; would be well capable of launching, is only too apparent. So is their dependence on their friends and allies in the West for moral.. support in this long-running confrontation, which is none of their seeking. When they say that they genuinely seek a reconciliation with the North and a reunification of the two parts of their divided country in accordance with the principles of self-determination I have no doubt that they are speaking the truth. Equally, it is perfectly clear that such a reunification, and the attendant possibility of withdrawing US forces, is way over the horizon.
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For the time being, the South Koreans' principal preoccupation is to draw North Korea into a dialogue, leading to a progressivee relaxation of tension, while at the same time
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discouraging the Western powers (and notably France and Japan) from undermining their negotiating position by making ill- considered moves in the direction of better bilateral relations with North Korea. Aside from this overriding aim, they like the Japanese appear to be very keen to establish a closer dialogue with the major Western European powers and, in the case of Britain, are encouraged by the evidence of recent Ministerial visits that we desire it too. They were, I gather, keenly disappointed that the Prime Minister did not visit Seoul before or after her visit to Tokyo in 1982. I think we should seriously consider recommending such a visit when a future opportunity appears. I have no doubt
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that Mrs Thatcher would be enormously impressed by the spirit and drive of the South Koreans, as well as by the glaring and painful nature of the division between North and South.
WASHINGTON
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9. My talks at the State Department on 3 and 4 December have been reported in outline in Embassy telegrams. They covered, on the first day, the Caribbean and Central America and on the second, the Far East and South Asia. On the latter areas, I have nothing to add to the telegrams
10.
At the insistence of the Americans, the CLOVER LEAF talks covered only the Caribbean and what Ambassador Motley described as 'operational orientation' in the "area. The talks, which will be reported on separately, were somewhat less fruitful than the previous round had been in identifying concrete opportunities for coordinated action. But they were nonetheless useful. We plan to hold the next round here possibly out of London in four or five months' time; bearing in mind that the regular tripartite consultations with the Americans and the Canadians on Caribbean questions are scheduled to take place at Chevening in the first week of February. As the Grenada elections were taking place even as we talked, we prudently allowed for the possibility of convening an extra CLOVER LEAF session on the following day if Sir Eric Gairy's GULP had achieved a surprise victory. Fortunately, that proved unnecessary, though the massive scale of the NNP's landslide may yet cause problems of a different kind.
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11. On Central America, as telegram no 3593 shows, I did not mince my words in explaining to Motley and his colleagues the intense Parliamentary and public pressure to which our Ministers would unquestionably be subjected if the US. Administration decided to launch direct military action in Nicaragua, even of the nature of a quick surgical strike against advanced fighter aircraft. The Americans took this in good part, as they did also my questioning as to whether the Administration was actively engaged in contingency planning for such an intervention Motley gave me a flat assurance that no such planning was currently in progress; and he repeated more than once that President Reagan himself fully supported the State Department's pursuit of US objectives in Nicaragua by diplomatic means, whether directly via the Shlaudeman- Tinoco talks or through the Contadora process. But I also had the impression, which was reinforced by a private conversation with Motley over dinner at his house on the previous evening, that the possibility that the Administration might change course on this issue at some future date should not be ruled out. Motley admitted that Ambassador Shlaudeman's own morale tended to oscillate, depending on how the Administration's policy veered between the hawks and the doves. He said that he himself might not stay the full four-year course at the State Department though I was not sure whether this admission indicated his ambition for higher things in other Departments or whether he felt that he could not stand the heat of the kitchen, which must be very intense at times, for very much longer.
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