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ELECTIONS, AND WHERE AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS AT ALL LEVELS WOULD BE IN PLACE BEFORE AND WOULD CONTINUE AFTER 1997.
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ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF HONG KONG WILL REMAIN HMG'S RESPONSIBILITY UP TO 1997. THIS MEANS NOT ONLY THAT WE MUST PRESERVE OUR SYMBOLIC CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN SUCH WAYS AS THE GOVERNOR CONTINUING TO BE APPOINTED BY THE CROWN, BUT ALSO THAT WE MUST RETAIN THE POWER TO DIRECT EVENTS IN THE TERRITORY IF THIS SHOULD BE NECESSARY. MOREOVER, THE CHINESE
WILL EXPECT US TO HAND HONG KONG OVER TO THEM IN 1997 AS A GOING CONCERN. THEY WILL STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY ARRANGEMENTS THAT SEEM TO
THEM TO SUGGEST ANY ATTEMPT BY HMG TO THROW OFF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND ESTABLISH A QUASI-INDEPENDENT HONG KONG.
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IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE ACCEPTABILITY OF ANY PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE ROLE OR METHOD OF APPOINTMENT OF THE
GOVERNOR WILL BE JUDGED IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT, NOT THAT OF THE 1990'S. HOWEVER LOGICAL THE PROPOSALS MAY SEEM FOR INTRODUCTION ONLY A FEW YEARS BEFORE 1997, THEY MUST ALSO COMMAND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG AT THIS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE TIME.
5. THESE PROPOSALS NEED TO BE CONSIDERED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND THAT THERE MAY WELL BE, BY THAT TIME, SOME FORM OF JOINT SINO BRITISH GROUP IN HONG KONG. THIS ISSUE IS DISCUSSED MORE FULLY IN A SEPARATE PAPER BUT, IN BRIEF, THE STRONG CHINESE
DESIRE TO ESTABLISH SUCH A GROUP IN HONG KONG MAY GIVE US SOME OPPORTUNITY TO ASSURE SOME COMPENSATORY ADVANTAGES, BY AGREEING
TO IT AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME AND WITH STRICT TERMS OF REFERENCE.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
6. THERE ARE 4 MAIN ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES:
(A) RETENTION OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR APPOINTED FROM LONDON UP TO
1997:
(B) A LOCALLY ELECTED GOVERNOR TAKING OVER THE FULL
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESENT OFFICE:
(C) RETENTION OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR APPOINTED FROM LONDON BUT
WITH AN ELECTED LOCAL CHIEF MINISTER:
(D) A LOCALLY ELECTED GOVERNOR, BUT WITH POWERS RESERVED TO HMG
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE.
7. OPTION (A) WOULD ENSURE THE RETENTION BY HMG OF THE POWERS
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