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5.
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
the retention of a British Governor and
Commander-in-Chief would provide the CPG with a justification for appointing a Governor from China after 1997; thereby undermining the concept of a Hong Kong SAR ruled exclusively by Hong Kong people;
the proposal caters for the need for Britain to be able to discharge her ultimate responsibility for the people of Hong Kong, so far as that can be achieved given the distances involved, the indefensibility of Hong Kong against Chinese aggression, and
the little that need be done in the conduct
of Hong Kong's external affairs, outside the Sino-British relationship.
it is highly probable that the proposals would bring about good government in Hong Kong: there is so much that the new
political leadership have to gain from demonstrating their capacity to govern well
and there is so much more for them to lose
by acting unconstitutionally or in a manner inconsistent with the Sino-British arrange- ments for the transfer of sovereignty in 1997 and the proposed SAR.
The demerits include:
(i)
the risk that Britain might in practice be less capable of intervening effectively to control or remove a Governor with popular support acting unconstitutionally or in a
manner hostile to Sino-British interests as
defined by the agreement, than would be the
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