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6. IF WE COULD BE CERTAIN THAT SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD SURVIVE,
I AM SURE THAT THE ADVANTAGE OF CIRCUMSCRIBING THE SECRETARY
OF STATE'S AND THE GOVERNOR'S POWER IN 1992 AS PROPOSED WOULD
OUTWEIGH THE DISADVANTAGE IDENTIFIED IN PARAGRAPH ↳ ABOVE.
BUT WE CANNOT BE AT ALL CERTAIN OF THAT. INDEED WHAT SCANT INDICATION
WE HAVE, IS THAT THE SAR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE UNDER THE DIRECT
CONTROL OF THE CPG, SUGGESTS THAT, NO MATTER WHETHER WE
RENOUNCE THE VETO POWER OF THE GOVERNOR OR NOT, PEKING WILL
INSIST ON RESERVING ULTIMATE POLITICAL CONTROL TO INSELF AFTER
1997 AND THAT THIS WILL BE SPELLED OUT IN THE BASIC LAW.
痛
7. ONE WAY ROUND THIS DILEMMA MAGHT BE TO AMEND PARAGRAPH 63 AS PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNOR IN PEKING TELMO 99 TO HONG KONG.
THIS WOULD EXCLUDE THE BULK OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ALL OF DEFENCE
FROM EXCO'S COMPETENCE, THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG IS UNDOUBTEDLY
A FOREIGN AFFAIR. WITH THIS FORMULA THE GOVERNOR'S POWER AND
BY EXTENSION THE POWER OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WOULD BE PRESERVED IN THIS AREA, AND NOTHING WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST, SINCE
PEKING WILL IN ANY CASE HAVE POWER AFTER 1997 IN THESE FIELDS.
PRESENTATION
3. IF YOU AGREE WITH THESE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS THE PAPER COULD,
I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT, STILL CONTAIN THE SECTION ON THE GOVERNOP.
EVANS
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MR WILSON
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SIR PCRADOCK
MR BURROWS,
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FUTURE EGRET
DESKBY 13053OZ PEKING
DESKSY 130800Z FCO