173

GR 600

SECRET

FUTURE EGRET

DESKBY 2012OOZ

SECRET

FM HONG KONG 20105OZ JUN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1664 OF 20 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING

CLIF

FOLLOWING FOR CLIFT FROM GOVERNOR.

Lee(176)

TOP COPY

HKK 011/3

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

2 O JUN1984

YOUFIGER

PA

MO

la

STRY

or Taken

YOUR TELNOS 1132 AND 1133: FUTURE EGRET: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE.

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1. THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH I SEE WITH THE PAPER IN YOUR TELNO 1133 ARE FUNDAMENTAL AND MY COMMENTS CANNOT THEREFORE BE IN THE FORM OF A CRITIQUE OF IT.

2. TO DEAL WITH YOUR CONCLUSION FIRST. I DO NOT AGREE THAT THERE COULD BE A DEAL WITH THE CHINESE IN WHICH WE WOULD TRY TO BUY THEIR ACQUIESCENCE IN A COMPLETE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT BY AGREEING TO A JOINT GROUP IN HONG KONG. THE CHINESE PURPOSE IN SEEKING TO ESTABLISH THE GROUP IN HONG KONG IS TO INSTAL A SUPERVISORY BODY OVER THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT AND TO GIVE THEMSELVES A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE EVEN BEFORE 1997. WE SHOULD BE LETTING THEM IN LONG BEFORE ANY PROMISE THEY GAVE ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN- MENT COULD BE TESTED: AND THEIR PRESENCE WOULD FRUSTRATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE AND AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT HERE.

3. MY SECOND POINT IS THAT THE PAPER STARTS FROM THE WRONG POINT. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, HMG'S OBJECTIVE IS TO ESTABLISH AS COMPLETE A STRUCTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE AND AUTONOMOUR GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG AS IS POSSIBLE BEFORE 1997 IN ORDER TO GIVE THE HONG KONG COMMUNITY THE GREATEST POSSIBLE CHANCE OF MAINTAINING THEIR AUTONOMY, AND TO AVOID HAVING TO HANDOVER HONG KONG DIRECTLY TO A CHINESE APPOINTEE IN 1997. THIS MUST MEAN ESTABLISHING A CHIEF EXECUTIVE WHO ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, BOTH OF WHICH WILL HAVE SUBSTANTIAL ELECTED MAJORITIES BY THE 1990S. THE ONLY WAY OF ASSURING THAT, SHORT OF DIRECT ELECTIONS, IS FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE HIMSELF TO BE ELECTED BY THE MEMBERS OF THOSE COUNCILS, IF NECESSARY AFTER A PERIOD OF CONSULTATION.

4. THERE ARE THEN TWO QUESTIONS. THE FIRST IS HOW HMG'S RESIDUAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE FIRELDS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE COULD BE EXERCISED. AND WHETHER HMG WOULD NEED SOME RESIDUAL POWERS IN RELATION TO INTERNAL SECURITY, AND TO ENSURE THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT DID NOT BREACH THE AGREEMENT WITH THE CHINESE.

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