GRS 430
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DESKBY 2009OOZ
Ante
174
SECRET
-OP COPY
FROM PEKING 200715Z JUN 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGM NUMBER 1152 OF 20/6/84
INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
HKK
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
2 0 JUN 1984
+3
DESK OFFICER
PA
REGISTRY
Acton Ty
Ive
(11
7
YOUR TEL NOS 1132-3: FUTURE EGRET:
DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. I AGREE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH 10
OF SECOND TUR. BUT, FOR THE REASONS SET OUT IN MY TEL NO 1147,
I BELIEVE THAT OUR AGREEMENT TO THE JOINT SELECTION/CONFIRMATION
OF TOP OFFICIALS OTHER THAN THE GOVERNOR IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING 1997 WILL PROBABLY BE A NECESSARY PART OF THE PACKAGE
FOR THE CHINESE AND, IN ANY CASE, COULD HAVE ADVANTAGES FOR US.
2. 1 NOTE THAT THE DRAFT IN SECOND TUR OMITS REFERENCE TO
THE POSSIBILITIES OF A MESSAGE FROM OR A FURTHER VISIT BY
THE SECRETARY. IMAGINE THAT THOUGHT IS BEING GIVE TO THESE.
My
3. I THINK THAT THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNO/LOCAL
CHIEF MINISTER OPTION SHOULD BE FURTHER BROUGHT OUT.
SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD SURELY BE VERY DISRUPTIVE OF THE PRESENT
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT, STRETHING WHICH WE WISH TO AVOID.
IT WOULD ALSO GIVE THE CHINESE A HEAVEN-SENT OPPORTUNITY,
AS YOU POINT OUT IN PARAGRAPH 7 BUT, IN MY VIEW, NOT STRONGLY
ENOUGH - TO INSTAL A MAN FROM PEKING AS SUCCESSOR TO THE
LAST BRITISH GOVERNOR. SUCH A PERSON WOULD PROBABLY NOT ONLY
RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENCE, SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
BUT MIGHT ALSO PUT IRRESISTABLE PRESSURE ON THE CHIEF MINISTER
IN OTHER SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT WHENEVER THE SAR DID SOMETHING
WHICH PEKING DID NOT LIKE
4. I SUGGEST THAT PARAGRAPH 8 (111) BE DELETED. WE SHOULD
ONLY BE REPLYING TO SOME EXTENT ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE JOINT
GROUP TO DEFUSE ANY NOVEMENT TOWARDS DISORDER. OUR PRIMARY
RELIANCE WOULD STILL BE ON THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
AND, IN THE LAST RESORT, ON OUR RESERVE POWERS.
IN ANY CASE, IN THIS CONTEXT THE JOINT GROUP COULD PROVE TO
BE AS MUCH OF AN ADVANTAGE AS A DISADVANTAGE.
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15.