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It would mean abandoning the arrangements in place since the 1979 conference. Other first asylum countries would want to repatriate as well, and (if it did not destroy our own repatriation programme) there would be a fresh round of 'competitive deterrence'. This may be no more than the average ambitious and self-seeking boat-person deserves (and it might cut the outflow at a stroke) but neither UNHCR nor public opinion are likely to see it like that. If we crossed UNHCR over all this we might of course lose their cooperation in settling refugees from Hong Kong: they did last year, after all, resettle more than the number of new arrivals;
d)
Hong Kong is also running the serious risk that if our repatriation arrangements break down (eg after public protests when the first one is shot for espionage and really I must say here that para 6 of Hong Kong telno 263 seems quite extraordinarily irresponsible) then they will be stuck with all subsequent arrivals of boat-people.
4. We should be exposed to criticism on all these points (as your draft minute to the Secretary of State recognises) the moment it became known that we were discussing repatriation in Hanoi. Clearly if we are prepared for criticism under our human rights commitments (over closed camps) there is no inherent reason why we should not risk it over repatriation. But I really wonder whether Hong Kong's current position over refugees warrants it. At worst they may end the year looking after an extra five or six thousand boat-people. UNHCR take a share of the costs. In closed camps they have no effect on employment or the Chinese populace. Indeed I wonder whether the closed camp policy has been given a chance to work, since most boat departures these days are well organised and must be planned some way in advance.
5.
Hong Kong were pressing for some form of revised policy over a year ago. But by the end of 1982 they had fewer boat-people than at the start. It seems hard to justify such a radical change of policy as a pre-emptive manoeuvre to avoid what hardly anyone would regard even at its worst as anything like a serious problem for the Hong Kong government. We should not broach the subject of repatriation in Hanoi unless we seriously, even if hypothetically, regarded it as a possibility. I do not think the present situation justifies going through the motions simply to come up (Hong Kong telno 263) with an answer for Hong Kong to give to the US Consul General. We should be able to decide for ourselves that repatriation is out of the question and ask our Ambassador in Washington to say so. That is what he is for.
8 March 1983
Anykya.
CM J Segar
South East Asian Department 233 5073
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