4.
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Mr Clift said that he strongly supported the Governor's point that every effort should be made to avoid this becoming an issue between Hong Kong and HMG. This was particularly important given the need to retain the confidence of the Executive Council during the current discussions about the future of the territory. HMG must be seen to be active in Hong Kong's interests, and it was important to establish if there was any chance that the Vietnamese were prepared to be lenient. considered that any criticism that HMG might incur for approaching the Vietnamese could be averted if it was made clear that we would only consider repatriation if we obtained satisfactory guarantees that those returned would not be ill treated.
5.
He
Mr Burns said that the outflow from Vietnam was decreasing and that the problem really lay in the reduction in resettlement opportunities, particularly in the US. He foresaw considerable presentational difficulties for HMG in even entering into discussions with the Vietnamese about repatriation.
Boat people had established a special place in world opinion as a persecuted minority who ran considerable risks in their attempt to find freedom. While he agreed that it was difficult to distinguish between economic migrants and genuine refugees, neither group could return to Vietnam with any degree of safety. The world would be astonished if, given HMG's initiative in 1979, we took the initiative to discuss repatriation. Parliamentary interest had already been aroused by press reports that Hong Kong was considering this.
6.
Lord Belstead asked if the knowledge that Hong Kong was repatriating refugees would encourage the Americans to increase their off-take of refugees for resettlement. Sir E Youde said that this was possible. They were certainly reluctant to continue with an open-ended commitment while Hong Kong was still admitting boat people. Attitudes to boat people had now changed, even in the UK, and resettlement countries were no longer resettling those that reached countries of first asylum. In these circumstances, Hong Kong could not continue indefinitely to offer asylum.
7.
Mr Donald said that HMG took a strong line against Vietnam in all other fora. There was a dangerous analogy with the much criticised Yalta policy of repatriating Russians after World War II. Nevertheless, he felt that we should go through the motions of approaching the Vietnamese, so that EXCO should feel that all possible avenues were being explored, but in the realisation that we would almost certainly get an unsatisfactory answer. Lord Belstead agreed that it was unlikely that we would obtain any satisfactory assurances from the Vietnamese. He did not consider that simply making an
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