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See D
See (31)
VIETNAMESE REFUGEES
+KK 243/5
RECEIVED IN NESISIPY NO. 51
16 MAR 1983
PA
RCICER
CONFIDENTIAL
INDEX
No
REGISTRY
Action Taken
1/3 CH16/3
RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN LORD BELSTEAD AND THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG AT 11.45 AM ON 10 MARCH
Present
The Rt Hon Lord Belstead
Mr A E Donald CMG
Mr R D Clift, HKGD
Mr K FX Burns, SEAD
Mr C MJ Segar, SEAD Mr RJ F Hoare, HKGD Mr M A Arthur
Sir Edward Youde GCMG MBE
4
1.
Lord Belstead said that after his previous meeting with - the Governor on 28 January he had recommended to the Secretary
of State that the UK should take additional Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong. Unfortunately, it had not been possible to gain agreement within HMG to this recommendation. This made it all the more important that something should be done to stem the flow of refugees to Hong Kong.
2.
An
Sir E Youde said that Hong Kong's problem was now a simple one. The numbers of boat people arriving in Hong Kong were increasing again while resettlement opportunities were decreasing. More boat people were expected to arrive in Hong Kong during the summer when the weather was favourable. ever-rising population in closed camps with no hope of resettlement would cause a considerable security problem. Moreover, Hong Kong people were beginning to compare boat people, whom they considered were now for the most part economic migrants, with illegal immigrants from China, and to ask why they were classified as refugees and not sent back to Vietnam.
3.
The Executive Council felt that other countries were happy to criticise Hong Kong's treatment of boat people but that few were still willing to help Hong Kong. He was anxious to prevent this becoming an issue between Hong Kong and HMG, and therefore proposed that HMG should discuss the question of repatriation with the Vietnamese. This would only apply to new arrivals, and due warning would be given. He recognised that if the Vietnamese were not willing to accept boat people back or if they imposed conditions which were too severe, it would not be possible to proceed with repatriation, but it was essential that the approach should be made. Moreover, the knowledge that Hong Kong was considering repatriation might in itself have a deterrent effect.
CONFIDENTIAL
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