DSR 11C
7.
CONFIDENTIAL
Public and parliamentary opinion might well be
suspicious if such an approach became known. Many people would argue that any fugitive from Vietnam was ipso facto a refugee. They might be surprised that we were apparently prepared to consider accepting assurances from the Vietnamese. There might also be repercussions on the willingness of UNHCR, the Americans and others to go on cooperating in the continued resettlement of those already in Hong Kong.
8.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv).
9.
We could however counter by saying that:
we were talking to the Vietnamese about a range of problems concerning refugees;
we were making no commitments at this stage. We wished to remain flexible in order to deal in the most reasonable way with problems created by Vietnamese refugees;
there would in any case be no question of involuntary repatriation without firm and
satisfactory guarantees being obtained;
we would of course only consider repatriating
those who did not qualify for refugee status
under the terms of the 1951 Convention.
1
I attach a draft telegram of instructions for your consideration.
CONFIDENTIAL