CONFIDENTIAL
32
HKK 243/5.
See (35)
51
APR 1983
Secretary of State
Mimte
VIETNAMESE REFUGEES IN HONG KONG
5813
HKR 243/3 (13
1. Paragraph 9 of my minute of 27 January discussed the difficulties that would arise from the repatriation of Vietnamese refugees. You asked that we consult the Ambassador in Hanoi before instructing him to make any approach to the Vietnamese.
2.
Mr Pike has advised that the Vietnamese still seem determined to punish any repatriates, and that it would be hard to give credence to any assurances they might offer on their treatment. He believes that there is also a real risk that the Vietnamese would exploit our posi- tion as demandeurs to obtain matching concessions. These points are valid, but they are only part of the case.
3.
riation.
I saw the Governor of Hong Kong on 10 March. We discussed repat-
He urged that the Ambassador in Hanoi should be instructed to probe Vietnamese attitudes further in an effort to establish whether they would in fact be prepared to accept returned refugees and if so, what scale of punishment they contemplated.
4.
5.
He made the following points:
a)
b)
Hong Kong continue to accept responsibility as a place of first asylum as agreed at the Geneva Conference of 1979. But resettlement countries are increasingly shirking the respons- ibilities leaving Hong Kong with an increasing hard core of refugees, they cannot resettle.
The numbers now in Hong Kong (over 12,000) are higher than at the same date a year ago and given the prospect of a new influx in the summer, a significant net increase in numbers is expected during 1983.
c) Public opinion in Hong Kong sees the Vietnamese as illegal
immigrants arriving from economic motives rather than as political refugees. It is increasingly difficult for the Hong Kong Government to justify treating Vietnamese differently from illegal immigrants from China, who are sent back against their will if caught.
d)
Forcible repatriation would only apply to new arrivals after due warning had been given, and could only take place if credible guarantees against harsh treatment could be obtained, and if we were not faced with unreasonable demands by the Vietnamese for a quid pro quo.
The last point is important because we should ourselves be guilty of inhuman conduct contrary to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if we sent refugees back to Vietnam, and at the same time had reason to believe that the Vietnamese Government would fail to respect their human rights.
CONFIDENTIAL
16.