b)
c)
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because the existing DISERO scheme assumes that states will be prepared to do precisely that. we have not been involved in DISERO and must presumably (your paragraph 2(a)) live with our policy as it is. (I imagine Home Office will confirm this).
But
RASRO also assumes that flag states will make guarantees automatic. So far we have insisted to GCBS, shipping companies and others - that we have to handle these on a case by case basis. I doubt if the Home Office would accept a scheme which involved automatic guarantees even if (paragraph 6(g)) once the pool was exhausted, we reverted to the existing guarantee system.
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Thirdly, the RASRO scheme is a quota albeit from UK's point of view a very reasonable one but of 10 per month (numbers which I am sure in other circumstances we, should have no difficulty accepting). Hong Kong might well feel aggrieved if we agreed to a quota of any kind after having refused any addition to the 1979 quota which was filled in mid 1982, (even though the RASRO quota is almost certainly lower than the number we would expect UK shipping to pick up in 1984).
An additional problem is that at Geneva we shall be representing the interests of dependent territories. We have so far insisted that chose with their own shipping registers accept the responsibilities involved. If we were disposed to accept the RASRO scheme we should
ave to decide whether to include an element for Bermuda and Hong long (and negotiate with them) or accept the UK's quota as including chem all (which would cut across our existing policy) or ask UNHCR to leal separately with dependent territories, which I imagine Hong Kong would not like at all and in any case would be curious since it would still be for the UK to represent them to UNHCR in Geneva and for HMG
we do) to issue the resettlement guarantees to third countries on heir behalf.
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7 As you point out Hong Kong have their own objections which - from the point of view of government interest rather than procedural doubts are probably stronger than ours. HKD will no doubt be commenting, but perhaps I could say from the point of view of the general lead lepartment that some of their arguments may be a little overstated, eg cost and the impact on other resettlement opportunities; but we should support their view that the first-port-of-call principle be retained. I would certainly expect many more ships to head for Hong Xong if they could on the east bound routes rather than Manila, Taiwan or Tokyo, since they would hope for sympathetic and efficient treatment. Sometimes the principle is an inconvenience for UK ship rescues but a solution can usually be found (for example with the recent Shell tanker bound for Durban which was cleared to disembark in Sing- ipore in less than a day). On balance I think we should support Hong Kong's concern on this point.
23 June 1983
ec Miss Walker UND
Mr Sindon MAED
сс
Abydeyar
CM J Segar
South East Asian Department
W 86A 233 5073
cc Miss Wilmshurst Legal Advisers
N Montgomery-Pott Esq, Lunar House
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