CONFIDENTIAL
محامل
even consider approaching their Government about 'guarantees' or arrang ments for any kind of repatriation. Our view of Hanoi's behaviour as well as their human rights record suggests we should even have to phras very carefully any suggestion that UNHCR look into this on our behalf. Neither we nor the Americans can have any interest in persuading the world against our better judgement that Vietnam is the kind of country, or has the kind of government, to which it would be reasonable to force, or even encourage, people to return.
bufile 15.
I think we could accept a joint approach in Hanoi based firmly Don insistence on better results in the ODP but, as at every stage of enophor
the ODP, it does not help to make it obvious to the Vietnamese that you have an interest in their co-operation - this year they have already started bargaining with the UNHCR for full payment of all the in-country administrative costs of granting exit visas and arranging departure.
6. I also have reservations about Australian policy towards Vietnam, because individual overtures to Hanoi will only encourage the belief that opposition to: the occupation of Cambodia can be split and that condemnation of their human rights record can be ignored. Mr Hayden is perfectly entitled to go to Hanoi and talk about resumption of aid in return for progress on Cambodia or easier emigration. But it runs counter to the firm policy we have been following for the last four years in close harmony with ASEAN. It is likely to produce very little but even so it will undermine our own position and there is no advantag in being associated in any way with Mr Hayden's visit, especially since he is likely to reveal subsequently whatever we asked him to say on our behalf.
7. I have now seen Mr Clift's minute of 9 June and the draft sub- mission and telegram. I would recommend concentrating on the proposal for UNHCR to issue a formal statement on the status of boat people, if necessary putting the US on the spot. We could abbreviate the first stage by merely asking UKMIS Geneva if they believed that the Vietnames would be prepared to provide formal guarantees. On the assumption they would say no we could then insist that they grasp the nettle of a forma statement.
14 June 1983
Doved J. Hope
P.P.
CM J Segar
2.
CONFIDENTI AL