2
the earlier outline, has developed some unacceptable features. Apart from much irrelevant historical detail, which betrays the usual academic wish to reinvent the wheel (not very well) but also sets the economic issues in a political context, the project is to address (inter alia) questions relating to the potential economic trade-off between the SEZ and Hong Kong (which could be tolerable if handled well) and also (which is not tolerable):
6.
"in what ways will the SEZ be used in a foreign policy manoeuvre (sic) to deal with (sic) the territories of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan; are current industrialisation processing investments in the SEZs compatible and complement- ary with the eventual merging (sic) of these territories?"
I have asked ODA for instructions but said to them that, on a personal basis, we would be speaking to Mr Faaland about this; and after discussing the matter briefly with you on 21 November, I did so that evening. I said that we had had doubts about the project in the first place; that ODA have been recon- ciled to it following the earlier clarification; but that the current presentation was not acceptable. I drew particular attention to the page mentioned above, and explained that this touched on one of the most sensitive issues of current British foreign policy which was anyway beyond the competence of the Development Centre.
7. Mr Faaland said that he saw that the matter had not been phrased well, to which I retorted that the matter went well beyond mere words, and that my immediate reaction was that the whole project needed to be withdrawn for redefinition.
Now that these very delicate issues had been mentioned, it would be difficult to restore our faith in the project. Mr Faaland demurred at this, but agreed that he would have to consider the matter very carefully.
8. The ODA have promised instructions, cleared with the FCO, in time for your meeting with fr Faaland. No doubt you will be asked to underline the insensitivity of the Centre in this matter. It will be difficult to kill the project now without disproport- ionate fuss. But I hope that Mr Faaland will be sensible enough to cut it back down to size.
9. I agree that an approach to the Secretary-General could prove necessary. But I think that we can await the outcome of your meeting with Mr Faaland before deciding on such a step.
претер
22 November 1983
cc:
B Ireton Esq
Econ, Service ODA
-C. Hum Esq✓
Hong Kong Dept, FCO -Mr Lewty
CONFIDENTIAL
TJ B George