SECRET
22. A second, related but milder course, would be not to reject
the final package, but to tell the Chinese, and to say publicly
if necessary, that we remained anxious to cooperate with China
in securing the future of Hong Kong, and were prepared to go on
discussing the Chinese proposals in the hope of building a
workable and acceptable package, but that hitherto we had been
unable to achieve this. We would then maintain this posture of
willingness but inability to cooperate in the hope that the
Chinese position would change. In the meantime, we should decline
to cooperate with the Chinese plan, in effect allowing them to get
on with the business of deciding what Hong Kong would be like in
1997, and confining our attention to holding things together as
best we could in the remaining 13 years. Such a course might lead
to full confrontation if the Chinese chose to play it that way, as
they well might. On the other hand, they might stop short of
this, and treat us as an unhelpful irrelevance getting in their
way in Hong Kong. Either way they would announce their plans
unilaterally. Many of the disadvantages of full confrontation
would apply in this situation also. Again, we should be unable
to do anything to mitigate the lot of Hong Kong inhabitants after
the handover. We would face similar immigration and attendant
political problems at home. We would usher in a period of
prolonged strain in Sino-British relations. By our refusal to
be associated with the post-1997 arrangements in any way, we would
greatly reduce their attractions and thereby inflict extra economic
damage on the territory. I see this course as essentially only a
SECRET
16.
/variant