SECRET
Redacted
under FOI exemption 27(1)(a)(c)(d)
·
14. The Chinese position is both tough and rigid. They are aware
of its underlying strength. They know that they have only to wait
until 1997, at which time 92 percent of Hong Kong passes to them
without effort and the remaining 8 percent is unviable on its own.
They also know that Hong Kong, even at present, is indefensible
against China, though of course they are unwilling to move at once
unless they have the excuse of clearly deteriorating public order
in the territory. They also have the advantage of putting forward
a plan (Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong) which is
irreproachable in international terms and of dealing in Hong Kong
with a population of their own race whom they can hope either to
intimidate or seduce. Our cards, on the other hand, are the
present demonstrable success of Hong Kong in our hands and the
fact that the Chinese would like to maintain prosperity if they
can do so without upsetting their nationalist aims. For that they
need British cooperation both in the period before 1997 and in the
international negotiations that will be necessary in order to
secure for the new government adequate access to international
markets. These cards have their value, though we should be unwise
to set that value too high.
Present Position
SECRET
10.