SECRET
3 -
that the Secretary of State should send him a short telegram. A draft for this purpose is also attached.
FED
agree.
Zir
R D Clift
Hong Kong Department
WH 307a 233 3184
1.
This is a
masterly survey,
in which fir P Cracock's description
ni
view
may
of this Chinese approach to this negotiations is
particularly impressive.
2.
hava
As for the prospects, there wne
Senbashed
tactical options.
It seems
3.
i
to me
clearly variations, and wo furtier examniction of strategic and
mar it
is possible to create conditions continue to operate
which thug Kong cam
m
Nu
and
Luits Seve
mat Mir
Нина Кола
Cow
An
much
as hikierto, for so yours after 1947; crucial question is whether the prople of
by brought to believe this.
Celikan
16/i
OR 110
SECRET
FM PEKING 1208237 DEC 30
1/2 / way
Pise Lette Comms that--th
движел ве ико
SECRET
13/12
う
and send
to likD
TOP COPY: 12
B
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1331 OF 12TH DEC 03
INFO HONG KONG
FUTURE OF HONG KONG.
1.
иккоор
R: OLIVED IN NEQI25.
DA
JJ DEC 183
CMY
I AM SENDING BY THE BAG LEAVING PEKING TODAY A DESPATCH ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, REVIEWING THE IP COURSE TO DATE AND OFFERING A FORECAST. THIS MAY BE OF USE TO MINISTERS IN CONDUCTING ANY
REVIEW OF STRATEGY.
2. THE GOVERNOR SAW THE DESPATCH IN DRAFT, BUT IT DOES NOT, OF COURSE, COMMIT HIM AND HE MAY WISH TO ADD HIS OWN COMMENTS
IN WHATEVER FORM.
CRADOCK
LIMITED
FED
HKD
PS/AR LUCE PS/PUS MR LIFFARD MR DONALD MR URE
COD advised on change of 'TOP COPY.
THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT ADVANCED
SECRET
- age 10
Daco 10
Redacted under FOI exemption 27(1)(a)(c)(d)
SECRET
5
THE HONG KONG NEGOTIATIONS
SUMMARY
Enter
on a
Sepante fale. 4/15/12
MKK040/23
RLOZIVED IN AEGISTRY
+ Sub 3
1.
The despatch reviews the negotiations to date and offers a forecast. (Para 1)
2.
Difficult negotiations with radically differing approaches by the two parties.
(Paras 2 and 3)
3.
The fight for continuing British administration. The Chine se make their plans known.
(Paras 4-6)
t
5.
The
The Chinese attitude explained. Political and emotional factors paramount. Ignorance, suspicion and impatience. Taiwan factor. (Paras 11 and 12)
6. Chinese leaks. Strength of Chinese position. Value of British cards. (Paras 13 and 14)
7 Present position. Possible assurances. Value of self rule. (Paras 15-17)
8. Prospects. Likelihood of agreement that may not be acceptable to Hong Kong opinion or attractive to British opinion. Steady degradation of the choice. (Paras 18 and 19)
9.
Problems arising from planned Chinese announcement in September 1984. (Para 20)
SECRET
/10. Three
I age Tu
Dave 10