CONFUCI 13.5
repent the body of Hong Kong opinion. He himself had been able to have meetings with a wide variety of people and was convinced that no one of any significance believed that sovereignty was an issue. He spoke warmly of Mr Brian Tisdall and Mr John Walden. UMELCO on the other hand appeared to believed that sovereignty -
should not be conceded and should be kept as a card to be played at
the right time. This was quite misconceived. In his view sovereignty was a poisoned chalice, which should be got rid of as
soon as possible.
5. Mr Adley said that he had great respect for the Governor as a negotiator but believed that he was out of touch and too much influenced by UMELCO opinion. In the circumstances there was a danger of a sensible agreement with China being frustrated.
Views on An Agreement with China
They did
6. In Mr Adley's view we had no power and no cards to play in the negotiations. He had had frequent meetings both with the Chinese Embassy here and with the NCNA in Hong Kong. He understood China's position. China wanted a peaceful and quiet transition.
not want to be put into the position of having to provide
substitutes for British administration in 1997. They were prepared
to respect Hong Kong's genuine autonomy. That was why talk of maintaining the "status quo" was so misleading. For some it meant the preservation of Hong Kong's freedoms, way of life plus the continuing link with Britain. But the people of Hong Kong did not want that link. They did want their freedoms to continue and China
would be prepared to meet them on that point.
Democracy for Hong Kong
7. Mr Adley said that there was a strong demand for genuine
democracy in Hong Kong; (a group of Hong Kong Students had written
to the Prime Minister about it and had received a routine reply).
Moreover the Chinese now not only did not oppose democratisation but positively wanted it. Their aim was to see representative government established so that an elected local administration could be in place well before 1997, thus minimising the effect of any
change at that date.
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