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8. Most Hong Kong people sceptical of this idea. Do not believe it can provide effective guarantees against PRC interference. Such an "insulator" currently provided by British administrative link.
9. In July/September meetings we concentrated on trying to educate Chinese about Hong Kong's complexities and basis for confidence. Chinese response suspicious. Clear that Chinese incorrectly
regarded this as attempt to justify continuing British
administration for own sake.
10.
W
argued for In October meeting sought to induce Chinese to set aside basic
detailed principles and concentrate on detailed discussions of practical
measures which might ensure stability and prosperity. Made some headway towards achieving this. Stressed readiness to explore any
ideas, including the Chinese ones, to see whether arrangements might
be agreed which would be of lasting value. This entirely without
prejudice to any final agreement, which would of course be subject
to Parliament's decision.
essentally
11. This approach (agreed with Hong Kong's Executive Council
(EXCO) during visit to London 6-8 October) initially well-received
mayi Appewers by Chinese. But indications since that they may now regard it only as further attempt to press for some form of
f):
consh administrative
link. Not so. We are receptive to any measures which would maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity in way acceptable to Parliament, China and people of Hong Kong.
12.
Sincerely
Maintaining close contact with Hong Kong opinion. Prime
Minister has said this will be taken into account. Made known to us
through many channels but role of EXCO central. Continuing
consultation with EXCO. Are Governor's Advisers and broadly
representative of Hong Kong feeling on the future. Recently in
London. Richard Luce in Hong Kong 24-28 September.
Chinese Propaganda
13. This has been strident, though lately toned down.
Contradictory elements. On one hand says we are rigid and
"colonialist". On other, implies we have conceded sovereignty. Not
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/so.