SECRET AND PERSONAL
2.
attended both sets of talks and you agreed that a visit by me to Hong Kong at some stage would certainly do no harm and might do good in that I would be showing my own personal interest as Permanent Under-Secretary. I shall certainly bear this in mind. One idea would be to come on from Delhi at the end of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in November, provided I can afford to be away for so long a stretch. If that did prove possible it would fill the gap between Richard Luce and the Secretary of State.
All this is really repeating what we discussed, but I thought I should set it down, partly for Percy Cradock's benefit, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter.
4.
ever
Это
Autung
Antony Acland
SECRET AND PERSONAL
LECRET AD FARSONAL
HKKOAO
25 JU 1983 роз
4.
Sir Antony Acland KCMG KCVO
FCO
Dear Antony,
en
"Crash"
BRITISH EMBASSY,
16 June 1983
на ако
PEKING.
cc. Privali kentory An Donald
Mm).24/6
COPY
3
PS/PUS) Spill sims his to thi
Pus inta lui subuish in of 157 vi
1. I agree very much with what Teddy Youde said in his letter of 4 June to you about the critical period we are now entering on Hong Kong. If substantial talks are indeed about to start (or even if they are not) we must expect the demands the issue makes on Ministers' time to increase over the next few months. It is important, particularly so as we now have a new ministerial team, that they should be fully apprised of this in advance.
2. As you know from my letter of 23 May, I agree that a visit to Peking by the Secretary of State might be desirable if we found ourselves deadlocked in the talks. I am not convinced, however, that another FCO minister would be a real alternative (Teddy's para 9). We had to press very hard to get Mr Atkins, a Cabinet Minister, in to see Zhao Ziyang in January 1982. The Chinese had some difficulty with the concept of a Lord Privy Seal. I could have no confidence that any FCO minister without Cabinet rank would see Zhao even at a time of crisis.
3.
Teddy also mentions the shortcomings of Yao Guang. Here 1 don't entirely agree with him. Yao Guang
can pass a message, as we have seen in the Prime Ministerial exchanges; and I have little doubt that what I say is recorded and gets through to Yao's masters. Whether it - or any British persuasions - can make an impact in the face of the Chinese leaders' ignorance and prejudice is another matter: we must do everything we can to get substantive talks going and to use them to the full for this purpose.
However, an encouraging development has been the entrance on the scene of Assistant Foreign Minister Zhou Nan, a very different sort of man, with whom it is possible to have a substantive exchange, even over the telephone. I would hope that, even if Yao were to continue to be the principal interlocutor, should be able to keep my lines open to Zhou.
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN
CLOSED FOR
40 YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION NO.......27.6-+------
Jours вис
neer
I
cc Sir Edward Youde GOIG HONG KONG
SECRET AD PERSONAL
PERCY CRADOCK
SECRET
A0
Mr Donald
FUTURE OF HONG KONG
1.
Oh - T
HKK040/12
2 5 JUL 1983
Si
on Taken
n2817
Dismosed PS/PXE mm
2
Before going on leave, Mr Clift left me the attached letter dated 4 June from the Governor to the PUS about ministerial visits and involvement.
2.
A draft reply for the PUS to send is now attached. The first part of it is based mainly on a manuscript draft by Mr Clift; paragraph 4 I have added in the light of the change of Secretary of State and of the Minister responsible for Hong Kong.
15 June 1983
شما لها
W Morris
Hong Kong Department
wonder whether the Pus would care to discun this
Correspondence (or rather the letter cd the Soparment's proposed reply). The governor wants a Minister to be seen to
have "day-to-day" supervision of
Year marathon!
He also wants
a
what
may
be a
two
weighty enough Minister to be able to visit Peking and secure access to the Chirèse Prime Minister. (But Mr. Atkins was a
full member Cabrist.) The other point, I think, is that the Governor
or
a
they ar
tunić to
907% of this time.
д
The
wants senior officials, or vritually 80%
senior official, to devote
to Hong Kong and
SECRET
/reasons.
this
may
not be pomble for budgetary / structural