also hope that a gap will be kept clear in his diary in which he could visit Hong Kong, and Peking, too, if it becomes necessary to lift the talks out of a rut.
The idea of a visit to Japan and Korea would fit very well with this. The Prime Minister's interest is well known, but she could not of course visit Peking again.
9.
An alternative would be for Hong Kong to be dealt with in the Office by a minister senior enough, if he were to visit Peking, to claim an interview with Zhao Zhiyang, as the Lord Privy Seal did in January 1981. The political impact of a ministerial visit to Peking would be much reduced, both here and in Peking, if the minister saw no-one more important than the Chinese Foreign Minister who does not take decisions on this issue.
10.
I am writing in this vein because I now see the second half of this year as a period which may prove crucial for the whole future of this territory. If talks are in progress we shall be seeking to lay the foundations of a settlement. I do not need to outline to you the gravity of the problems which will fall on the Secretary of State's desk if things go wrong. We can of course have no assurance that they can be made to go right whatever we do: the Chinese position has been in substance very unyielding. But whatever happens it would certainly be wise for it to be publicly evident that the full resources, ministerial and official, in the F.C.0. had been mustered to the cause.
11.
I hope therefore that you will be able to bring home to Foreign Office Ministers when they assemble after
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