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5. Sir Geoffrey Howe mentioned that Mr Shultz had been very impressed by the development of ASEAN. What were its prospects? Tan Sri Ghazali replied that, from being mainly concerned with economic, social and cultural affairs, ASEAN had developed into something much more political. Its existence helped its members in their internal politics: it contributed to stability in Thailand and to the position of President Marcos. It was becoming a habit of mind in the area: there were now ASEAN-wide meetings, under pri- vate auspices, of, for example, dentists, artists, businessmen and young people. An ASEAN conscience was developing: Singapore now consulted Malaysia about the impact of new factories, although her willingness to countenance tin smuggling hurt Malaysia.
It was a less formal organisation than the European Community.
6. The Secretary of State said that ASEAN had been particularly effective over Cambodia: what were the prospects there? Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie referred to the difficulties in the area resulting from the inefficient administration of the Thai Kingdom over the last hundred years.
Vietnam's talk of unification and her subsequent invasion of Cambodia had frightened Thailand. The Vietnamese had their own strategic reasons for invading, although they claimed that their object was to put an end to genocide. However, the Viet- namese invasion threatened China's own ambitions in the area and the Chinese had backed Pol Pot. This had failed to produce the right result, so the Chinese now wanted a completely neutral Cambodia. This was better for them than a form of Communism which might lean. towards Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Their present position obliged them to play down subversion in South East Asia (mainly through the ethnic Chinese communities). However, they would reactivate it if South East Asia leant towards the Soviet Union.
7. Tan Sri Ghazali believed that, given 20 years, South East Asia could become sufficiently strong to deny the area to both China and the Soviet Union. Malaysia believed in a neutral and non-communist Cambodia. The Russians, for their part, had long sought a place in South East Asia. He did not think they wanted a base for global strategic reasons, but rather for subversion and for the servicing of their naval and air activities. They paid the Vietnamese $3m a day for their bases, but saved themselves some $4m per day on servicing costs: so they had a good deal. The Russians were develo- ping their own range of contacts in Cambodia and would one day tell the Vietnamese to go home, because the Russians could get on without them.
8. Mr Luce asked about the Heng Samrin regime. Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie said that Sihanouk was ready for a reconciliation.
It was an ineffectual regime. According to Malaysian intelligence sources, the villages in Cambodia were now moving against Heng Samrin.
Nor did they want Lon Nol or Pol Pot; they would prefer Sihanouk. Son Sann's was the faction within the Coalition which was at present strengthening its position. He now had some 12,000 followers. Increasingly, the Cambodians wanted to be free of Vietnam. There were now more refugees coming from Vietnam itself, reflecting laxity in border and port controls and the efficacity of bribes.
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