1
1
OCNE IN MAL
UK/INDIA BILATERAL OFFICIAL TALKS: 21 OCTOBER 1983 AT 3.15 P.M. Present
Mr M K Rasgotra, Foreign Secretary
Dr J S Teja, Additional Secretary (East/West and UN and Policy Planning Division)
Mr Sanjay Singh, Under-Secretary
(UK)
India/China
1.
SECOND SESSION
Sir Julian Bullard
Sir Robert Wade-Gery
Mr Samuel
Mr Stark
The afternoon session opened with a brief exchange on India's relations with China, relating specifically to the fourth round of bilateral talks in Delhi opening on 24 October. Mr Rasgotra said that so far as the border was concerned a vital element from the Indian viewpoint would be selling a settlement in domestic political terms. The north/east border was one thing (i.e. probably not too difficult). In the west, where adjustments in favour of China might well be needed, the domestic problem would be much greater. The Indians had made some gestures but the Chinese were still not budging. There seemed no prospect of a return to the Colombo proposals. The Chinese were making accommodating noises but it was unclear what this meant in practice. Meanwhile an effective normalisation was taking place in other respects with increasing contacts, delegations visiting in both directions etc. Mr Rasgotra thought the Chinese could probably live more or less indefinitely with the border as it stood. But this was more difficult for India. The objective must be for the Indian Government to achieve a solution and to carry public opinion with them.
Hong Kong
2. Mr Rasgotra asked about the state of discussions between the UK and China on Hong Kong. Sir Julian Bullard said this was the biggest of Britain's remaining decolonisation problems.
The key, agreed in principle by both the UK and China, was to maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. How to do this was another matter and a great effort of imagination would be needed on the part of the Chinese, who despite persistent British efforts still failed to understand that the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong depended on confidence. We had hoped that during the summer recess the Chinese would study the detailed account given to them by the British side of the existing legal and administrative structure of Hong Kong, and would return to the discussion with a greater willingness to understand. But in September the Chinese had continued to say only that, on reversion of sovereignty to China, the Hong Kong people would be allowed to run their own affairs as a special entity. We still thought it possible to find an arrangement acceptable to China, the people of Hong Kong
CONFIDENTIAL
/and