CONFIDENTIAL
But Itty/
have
KOREA: NORTH/SOUTH
1. The Korean expert in the Soviet MFA spoke interestingly and
The Russians frankly about relations with North and South Korea. differed from the North Koreans on questions such as the degree of contact with South Korea and refused to have their policy dictated entirely by Pyongyang. It had been the Soviet intention to send representatives to the IPU Conference, and they kept open their options about participation in the Olympic Games (the Mongolians said the same). On the wider question, the Russian expert said after a slight hesitation that no attack by the North on the South was possible because the North had given a guarantee in this sense to the Chinese and because both Koreas were so strongly backed that no attack was possible. Allowing for the fact that the Russians were deliberately trying to appear reason- able I found this an interesting assertion and slightly at variance with the standard line (which was also produced) to the effect that the real obstacle to progress was the US forces in South Korea.
2.
Ogura, the Japanese expert on Korea, was as usual very interesting. I found his description of Chinese interest in the Japanese proposal for developing family exchanges between China and South Korea particularly notable, Ogura also spoke convinc- ingly of the difficulties the Japanese had in bringing their own relations with North Korea into some form of balance with China/ South Korea relations, given that Japan was already some way ahead in developing contacts with the North and could not easily slow down. One of the main problems for the Japanese Government is that any action could provoke demonstrations in Tokyo by the many hundreds of thousands North or South Koreans, which could for example cause a security risk to visitors such as President Reagan. Japan cannot therefore move towards recognition of North Korea in the way that, say, the French can. Ogura was dismissive of the thought that French recognition of North Korea could be balanced by any cross-recognition of the South by any East European state - the two were quite out of proportion. Nor did he see any possibility in practice of distinguishing between recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations.
3. Kato, the European Director-General in the Japanese MFA, differentiated between Soviet and Chinese attitudes towards North Korea. The Russians were complacent about North Korea, but the Chinese were more anxious to retain North Korean trust and this accounted for their demonstrativeness and for example their abstention in the UN vote on the Korean airliner.
4. The Japanese assessment of the aftermath of the Rangoon bombing has been reported separately. The Japanese are quite convinced that it was the North Koreans who were responsible, given the methods used, and are clearly playing their part in attempting to calm reaction in the South. Ogura did not think it likely that the South Koreans would succeed in, getting the Burmese to cut their links with North Korea.
2 November 199*
CONFIDENTIAL
Markshist
M Elliott
Far Eastern Department