SINO/JAPANESE RELATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
1. Mr Watanabe, Minister at the Japanese Embassy in Peking, had an interesting theory about Sino/Japanese relations. He maintained that in the spring of 1982 China had altered its policy from anti- Soviet hegemonism to anti-hegemonism in general. Attacks on a resurgence of Japanese militarism dated from that time and the language of China's pronouncements had changed from "supporting" Japan's resistance to Soviet expansionism and cooperation with the United States to "understanding" those policies. The attack on Japan over the text books issue had come when the Sino/US talks were going badly and China needed a scape-goat to attract the attention of China's public opinion.
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2. Mr Kato in the Japanese MFA also spoke about this. He referred to the Soviet allegations that the Soviet Union and China had agreed on their attitudes to Japanese militarism among other international issues discussed during Kapitsa's visit to Peking. This agreement was very superficial. China's worries over Japanese militarism related primarily to history; Soviet worries related to the present and future. Kato did not see any major problems between Japan and China, but at the same time saw less potential in the relationship; the Japanese were less interested in China and saw the expansion of China's potential as a very slow process.
3. Conversation at a later dinner in Tokyo with another MFA representative and the Counsellor at the US Embassy went rather further into this issue. Those present generally agreed that China did not see Japan as a threat and did not in practice need to warn against Japanese hegemonism as such. Relations between Japan and China were not very substantial, although there was some dispute as to whether the Chinese really disliked the Japanese people or not. Perhaps the main difference between the two countries was that Japanese tended to talk to others before making up their minds; the Chinese, as representatives of the Middle Kingdom, saw no such need and made up their own minds without reference to anybody else. As regards China and Japanese militarism, it was notable that Hu Yaobang had told the JSP leader that Japanese defence spending should not go over 2% of GNP - ie it could still double.
1 November 1983
Mark Swisht
M Elliott
Far Eastern Department
CONFIDENTIAL