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Tokyo. After the Japanese had made the ritual expressions of gratitude about our entertaining of Prince Hiro, we had some exchanges about the timing of visits in particular of the Secretary of State, whom the Japanese want to see in Tokyo as soon as possible, and Mr Nakasone, who is now unlikely to come to the UK much before June; on this last point I asked for as much notice as possible. I had an hour with the Economic Affairs Bureau of the MFA covering familiar ground and was treated to a long lecture about current French policies of developing self-sufficiency with the EC and paying less heed to industrial cooperation with third parties such as Japan. I also had a useful discussion with the Trilateral Commission representative in Tokyo, Yamamoto, who is keen on developing Japan/European and Japan/UK relations using regular conferences as a tool but who was a little sceptical about getting senior Japanese to come regularly to the UK only, or even to a selection of European countries.
3. I attach notes on some of the international themes discussed. Of these perhaps the most interesting points are:
a) Sino/Soviet Relations.
Unsurprisingly the Russians
were anxious to give the impression of progress and the Chinese the opposite; the truth no doubt lies somewhere inbetween. However I was struck by the strength of Japanese fears of a rapprochement between the two powers and of a consequent Sino/Soviet alliance which would dominate Eurasia. Some Japanese clearly thought that the Chinese would in the end regard the Soviet Union as ideologically a safer partner than the West.
I was also interested by the suggestion from the US DCM in Peking that a deal on Mongolia might provide the break- through.
b) Taiwan/Hong Kong. The Japanese assessment is that the Chinese are genuinely fearful of failure in the Hong Kong negotiations perhaps because of the resultant damage to the prospects of reunification with Taiwan. The US DCM agreed that Taiwan was a major factor but doubted whether the Chinese were objective enough to imagine the prospect that they could ever fail in Hong Kong.
c) Korea. The Japanese see some prospect of a Chinese softening towards the South Koreans, particularly on family contacts, but are very hesitant about matching it by any Japanese move towards the North Koreans. They are also apprehensive of French recognition. The Russians seemed to me to be dissociating themselves from the North Koreans just a little more than they needed.to.
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