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Mr. Bean Sock of Starte Mr. Masti see &
MathTA (HUD) Mr. Moms to
Private Secretary
1.
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FROM: R D CLIFT, HKD DATE: 11 October 1983
cc: PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Mr Giffard Mr Donald Hd/FED
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Hd/Planning Staff Mr Roberts, News Dept MICKOGO15
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HONG KONG
Mr Holmes' minute of 10 October..........
Wu Xueqian's remarks in Canada
2.
7 ORA/CO
The Chinese Foreign Minister's remarks were I, believe important. We are ensuring that attention is drawn to them in the assessment to be issued by the JIC this week.
European Community
3.
I agree that we could, in trying to build guarantees for Hong Kong, work on the European Community angle. This is a useful card because much of Hong Kong's export earnings comes from textiles sent to the United States and the Community under the MFA. Although there is no formal association of Hong Kong with the Community, we should try to encourage our partners there, as well as others in GATT, to support a future autonomous regime for Hong Kong and indeed to make clear that the continuation of special arrangements for Hong Kong goods could only apply while effective autonomy continued. This is included in the annex to our Reappraisal paper and in the outline of possible arrangements for Hong Kong sent to No 10 with your letter of
6 October.
4. If this idea is to be developed, we shall need at the right stage to extend to our Community partners the sort of briefing which we have been giving the Americans. I do not think the time has come yet but we shall watch it.
Taiwan and Hong Kong
5.
Our assessments have taken account of the clear Chinese interest in a successful arrangement for Hong Kong which would encourage Taiwan to accept their ''reunification'' overtures. We have also noted the Chinese emphasis on the 9 point plan for Taiwan as a possible model for Hong Kong. Wu's remarks in Ottawa were the most specific statement so far that the two ''special administrative regions'
'' would have much the same regime. This could be helpful in trying to develop guarantees, although we should not of course expect to get all the points which have been promised for Taiwan, such as separate armed forces.
Nor is
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