13. FUNDAMENTALLY HOWEVER, FEW PEOPLE HERE BELIEVE THAT THE
FORTHCOMING PHASE OF HIGH LEVEL DIPLOMACY WILL ALTER BASIC RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE SINO/US/SOVIET TRIANGLE. THE CHINESE, AS INKSTER'S TELELETTER OF 4 OCTOBER, POINTS OUT, WILL STILL
PSUE THEIR TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS FOR THE SAKE OF THE
MATERIAL BENEFITS THEY GAIN, RELAXATION OF TENSION ON THE
FRONTIER (WHICH SERVES THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PURPOSES OF THE
LEADERSHIP) AND FOR THE SAKE OF MAINTAINING FREEDOM OF
MANE OUVRE VIS A VIS THE UNITED STATES. THESE CONTACTS ARE
USEFUL AND COULD CONCEIVABLY BEAR FRUIT IN THE LONG TERM.
BUT THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE A SINO/SOVIET BREAKTHROUGH.
THE AMERICANS FOR THEIR PART WILL STILL NEED TO PURSUE A
DIALOGUE, PARTICULARLY ON ARMS CONTROL, WITH THE RUSSIANS, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE STATE OF RELATIONS WITH PEKING, AND IRREDUCIBLE
DIFFERENCES OVER TAIWAN WILL CONTINUE TO CONSTRAIN THOSE RELATIONS
FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. CHINA'S NEED TO COUNTER-BALANCE
THE THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION CAN BE MET WITHOUT ENTERING
INTO A FORMAL STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.
BUT THE LEADERSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO NEED WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
TO FULFILL THEIR MODERNISATION PROGRAMME. WHILE THERE ARE SOME
HERE WHO TALK WISHFULLY ABOUT QUOTE STRATEGIC COOPERATION UNQUOTE
WITH CHINA, MOST U.S. POLICYMAKERS BELIVE THAT IN
CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCE THEIR OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO DRAW CHINA
INTO GREATER DE FACTO COOPERATION WITH THE WEST BY A COMBINATION
OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS,
AND IT IS IN THIS LIGHT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE FORTHCOMING
SINO/US EXCHANGES WILL PROBABLY BE MEASURED.
FED PLEASE PASS COPY TO HKØD,
SOVIET DEPT
TRED
RESEARCH DEPT
+ NAD; PUSD; NED;
in Martin, Calinet Office. DIH, DS II, DS 13, MOD Col MW Jenkins, ARMDIC, MOD
SIGNED: S J GOMERSALL
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