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Chinese propaganda, that when talking of sovereignty the Chinese
meant also the right to administer, since this was in their eyes
a function of sovereignty. Again, their public line was that
this was a matter of principle.
4. I explained that the talks were being conducted against a
background of good general relations between Britain and China,
and the atmosphere at the talks was friendly.
There was,
however, the phenomenon of the barrage of hostile Chinese
propaganda. I said that there were three possible objectives
in this propaganda stream. First, the Chinese wished to put pressure on the British negotiators. Secondly, they wished to
develop a 'united front' among the people of Hong Kong with a
view to separating their allegiance from the British and
directing those who would listen towards the Chinese 'motherland'.
Thirdly, the Chinese were engaged in what their ideologues
sometimes described as a 'tit for tat' struggle where they felt
obliged to answer criticisms and arguments which stemmed from
the press and other sources in Hong Kong, as well as in the London papers.
5.
Thus it was difficult for the outside observer to make much
of what was going on. It was the confidential talks that actually
counted. Nevertheless, some of the themes occurring in Chinese
propaganda had been touched upon in the talks. Others had not. Many were distorted. The main point was that we were negotiating
patiently and quietly, and intended to make a success of the
negotiation if we could. The next round of talks was scheduled
for 19 and 20 October.
6. Mr Francis expressed gratitude for this briefing which he
had found helpful background. He fully understood why I could
not go further without getting into details of the actual
negotiation.
7.
I was also asked about Brunei. I gave a brief account of
the negotiation which led to the September agreement with the
Sultan to retain the Gurkha battalion for a further five years.
Mr Francis was pleased to know.
Aratonald
A E Donald
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