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NOTE OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS ON ASIAN SUBJECTS HELD ON 8 JUNE 1983 IN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
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Present
Mr CSR Giffard
Mr A E Donald
Mr M Elliott (FED)
Mr R Burges Watson (SEAD) Mr M D Uden (FED)
Mr Nakajima (Deputy Minister, MFA) Mr Fujii (Deputy Director General, MFA) Mr Kurokawa (Director, MFA)
Mr Takata (MFA)
Mr Tsutsumi (Japanese Embassy) Mr Imanishi (Japanese Embassy) Mr Shigeie (Japanese Embassy)
General
1.
Mr Nakajima described factors for stability in Asia as:
a.
C.
the healthy economic development of ASEAN, until recently;
China's realistic policies of modernisation of her economy; and
India's more liberal attitude towards the outside world and her wish for better relations with the USA.
There were, however, two disturbing factors:
2.
a. Soviet military activities; and
b.
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the economic difficulties caused by recession.
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The ASEAN countries were apprehensive of Russian influence (Thailand had been particularly outspoken on this) and of Chinese contacts with the local communist parties. Lee Kuan Yew believed there were threats from both the Soviet Union and China, although the Soviet threat was more immediate. Prem had told Nakasone that he regarded increasing Japanese defence expenditure as a contri- bution to stability in the region. For Cambodia, the objective remained a comprehensive political settlement with self-determination for the Cambodian people and complete Vietnamese withdrawal. Japanese aid to Vietnam would remain frozen. It was important to maintain Western interest in South-East Asia, in particular in Cambodia. China's primary objective was a peaceful environment for her modernisation (and the West should respond to Chinese calls for assistance in this). The Chinese had described their talks with the Russians as a marathon. On his January visit to Europe, Mr Abe had had the impression that the Europeans saw more likelihood of progress in the Sino-Soviet talks than the Japanese.
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