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00 PEKING
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SECRET
FM FCO 081135Z MAR 83
TO IMMEDIATE PEKING
TELEGRAM NUMBER 135 OF 8 MARCH
AND TO HONG KONG (FOR MCLAREN)
нико4015
9 MAR 1983
Im AF13
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF HKGD
WAS SENT TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 376 OF 7 MARCH
G5
FOR GOMERSALL FROM MORRIS
MORRIS
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YOUR TELELETTER OF 3 MARCH: CSIS SEMINAR ON HONG KONG
1. WE DO NOT WISH TO APPEAR UNHELPFUL AND WE FULLY TAKE THE
POINTS IN YOUR PARA 4. WE AGREE TOO THAT IT WILL BE INTERESTING
TO HEAR WHAT OTHERS HAVE TO SAY.
2.
HOWEVER, AS YOU SURMISE, OUR TALKS WITH THE CHINESE AND OUR
POLICY ON HONG KONG'S FUTURE ARE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE SUBJECTS
AND IT WOULD BE QUITE WRONG, PARTICULARLY AT THE PRESENT TIME,
FOR BRITISH OFFICIALS TO ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION OF THIS KIND, BE
IT ON OR OFF THE RECORD. THERE IS ALSO A GREAT DANGER OF BEING
DRAWN INEVITABLY INTO DISCUSSING SOVEREIGNTY. THIS MUST BE
AVOIDED.
3.
WHILE WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR ATTENDING THIS SEMINAR
YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT DO SO AS A SPEAKER. WE SUGGEST YOU
EXPLAIN THE POSITION IN ADVANCE AND ATTEND AS AN OBSERVER.
HOPE YOU COULD AVOID PARTICIPATING IN THE DISCUSSION.
WE
IF YOU JUDGE IT NECESSARY TO INTERVENE YOU SHOULD LIMIT ANY
CONTRIBUTION TO FACTUAL BACKGROUND, FACTORS AFFECTING CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG, AND OTHER SIMILAR NON-CONTROVERSIAL POINTS.
•
WE REALISE (YOUR PARA 4) THAT REQUESTS OF THIS KIND ARE
LIKELY TO CONTINUE BUT AT PRESENT WE HAVE TO PLAY OUR HAND IN AS
LOW A KEY AS POSSIBLE.
PYM
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